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Some scholars, both Chinese and Western, have argued that
the Chinese Constitution is no longer a classic “sham constitution,”
and that it is in fact starting to fulfill, at least in a limited way, its
power-delineating and rights-protecting functions. They believe that
signs have emerged that show that, at times, the Chinese Constitution
does in fact influence the outcome of legislative debates, for example.
This article argues that such optimism is misplaced, and that,
at present, the Chinese Constitution does not carry any meaningful
legal weight. It does, however, perform an important political
function: it is a tool for the Chinese Communist Party to engage in
legitimacy-enhancing constitutional reform rhetoric. At the same
time, would-be reformers outside the ruling elite also use
constitutionalist rhetoric to try to push the Party to live up to its
reformist promises. At present, however, these attempts by reformers
outside the system have yet to bear any fruit.
In this article, I use the analytical framework of authoritarian
constitutionalism to investigate the 2013 constitutionalism debate
inside China. I argue that this debate demonstrated the ways in
which the Party uses the constitution as a “false blueprint,” one that
suggests a destination at which the Party has no intention of arriving.
The debate also demonstrated a growing consensus among moderate
reformist scholars on the need for reform. In response to this
consensus, the Party has had to turn to ultra-conservative voices to
keep the moderates in check. This balancing act highlights the
difficulties that the Party faces in using the constitution to bolster
continued one-party rule.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Former Wenzhou City Vice-Mayor Ye Jiren might seem like
an unlikely poster child for constitutional reform. Accused of misuse
of power over the illegal allocation of land to a local company, Ye
was convicted and sentenced to three years in prison in August 2013.
According to local authorities, the misallocation of city land to the
Shopping Basket Development Company cost the government more
than 115 million RMB or, roughly, 18.5 million US dollars in lost
revenues.1
And yet, Ye’s case is deeply troubling. He was held in a form
of extra-legal incommunicado detention known as shuanggui, or
double regulation, for over a year, from March 2011 to May 2012.
Ye alleged that he was tortured during that time and pressured into
1 Zhao Xiaoyan (赵小燕), Wenzhou Yuan Fushizhang Ye Jiren Lanyong Zhiquan Huo
Xing San Nian, Jiashu Ni Shangsu (温州原副市长叶际仁滥用职权获刑三年，家属拟上
诉) [Former Wenzhou Deputy Mayor Ye Jiren Sentenced to Three Years for Abuse of
Power—Family Plans to Appeal], ZHONGGO XINWEN WANG (中国新闻网) ［CHINA NEWS
NET] (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/08-16/5173481.shtml.
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making a false confession. 2 Furthermore, he claimed that the
mistreatment continued when he was later transferred to police
custody. He was only allowed to see his lawyer, Wang Zhanxin, on
September 7, 2012, roughly a year and a half after being detained. In
April 2013, more than two years after he had first been detained, his
case finally went to trial.
Ye maintained his innocence during his initial trial and
claimed on appeal that he faced abuse so intense that he adopted a
six-character mantra: busi, bucan, buchi: don’t die, don’t become
crippled, and don’t go insane.3
In September 2013, his case was cited by one of China’s most
prominent constitutional law scholars, Central Party School Professor
Cai Xia, as evidence of the increasing sense of insecurity among Party
members.4 While the general public might believe that government
officials possess great power, Cai argued that they can, in fact, be
quite vulnerable. When they enter into shuanggui, they leave all legal
protections behind.
Ye’s case shows that officials, no less than average citizens,
might find themselves in need of the rights protections found in the
Chinese Constitution. Cai suggested that government officials caught
in moments of candor would probably echo the sentiments of many
academics, intellectuals, and activists who have called for immediate
and wide-ranging reform.5 She went on to argue that constitutional
reforms which would better protect individual rights, regardless of
circumstances, would in fact find much support from within the Party.
Cai’s talk was but one of many conversations on the need for
constitutional reform in China that took place in 2013. To be sure,
China is no stranger to public discussion on constitutional reform, but
the first ten months of 2013 saw a level of conversation on
constitutionalism not seen in China in nearly a decade. The debate
drew hundreds of participants, including academics, public
intellectuals, journalists, rights activists, state-affiliated think tank
2 Wang Zhanxin & Zhuang Xinting, This Is a Classic Unjust and False Case (July 11,
2013), http://qing.blog.sina.com.cn/3435245570/ccc1b002330040eq.html.
3 Cai Xia (蔡霞), Xianzheng Minzhu Caineng Shi Zhongguo Changzhi Jiuan (宪政民
主 才 能 使 中 国 长 治 久 安 ) [Only Constitutionalism Can Bring Long-term Peace and
Stability to China), GONGSHI WANG (共识网) [CONSENSUS NET] (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.
21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2013090291129.html.
4 Id.
5 Id. (“the feeling of crisis within the Party is also quite strong”).
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researchers, and government officials. Virtually every prominent
constitutional scholar weighed in, including several law school deans
and a number of respected elder scholars whose ties to senior Party
leaders are well known.
Just as importantly, the debate reached a large number of
private citizens. It is likely that millions of citizens followed the
debate, which raged first and foremost online and on Weibo,6 China’s
version of Twitter. The debate also (at least briefly, before state
censors blocked further discussion) played out on the pages of
China’s top newspapers and magazines, in the elite classrooms of
Beijing, and in private salons across China.7
The tenor of the debate has been described as “highly
ideological,” with each side possessed of “theological” certainty. 8
One participant expressed regret over elements of “personal attack”
and “demonization” in the debate.9
And, as perhaps may be expected of a debate whose battle
lines have remained static for years, few if any participants confessed
to being convinced by any of the arguments of other camps. 10 One
prominent scholar prided himself and his comrades for “maintaining
our composure, and not retreating, even a half step.”11
Broadly speaking, three different camps took part in the
debate: the Socialist Constitutionalists, the Liberals, and the Leftists,
who were also referred to as Anti-Constitutionalists. As their name
6

At one point in late May, more than 7 million posts on Weibo referred to the
constitution, a number that was reduced to 1.9 million by government censors soon thereafter.
Li Qi & William Wan, China’s Constitution Debate Hits a Sensitive Nerve, WASH. POST
(June 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/06/03/chinasconstitution-debate-hits-a-sensitive-nerve.
7 The fact that many of the key interventions in the debate were posted online—
including transcripts of public talks and roundtable discussions—meant that the debate
attracted a truly global Chinese-speaking audience, and attracted interventions from
members of the Chinese diaspora, both in other parts of Asia and in the West.
8 Zheng Yongnian (郑永年), Zhongguo de Xianzheng Zhi Zheng Shuoming le Shenme?
(中国的‘宪政’之争说明了什么?) [What Does China’s ‘Constitutional Governance’
Debate Mean?], AI SIXIANG ( 爱 思 想 ) [LOVE THOUGHT] (June 18, 2013), http://www.
aisixiang.com/data/64914.html.
9 Id.
10 An extensive—though by no means exhaustive—review of the written record of the
debate by this author failed to generate even one example of a participant admitting to being
convinced by arguments made by an opposing camp, or of having one’s mind changed by
the arguments of another side.
11 Hua Bingxiao (华炳啸), Fanxian Pai de Lilun Pingkun Ji Qi Sixue [反宪派的理论
贫 困 及 其 死 穴 ] (The Theoretical Impoverishment and Achilles’ Heel of the AntiConstitutionalists), AI SIXIANG (爱思想) [LOVE THOUGHT] (July 3, 2013), http://www.
aisixiang.com/data/65356.html.
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suggests, the Socialist Constitutionalists support constitutional
reform under the leadership of the Communist Party. Though they
do not question the Party’s monopoly on political power, they believe
that that power should be exercised through, and checked by,
constitutional norms.
The Liberals are skeptical that meaningful reform can take
place under the existing constitutional framework, which, they often
point out, constitutionally enshrines the leadership position of the
CCP. More generally, they profess greater skepticism of the Party’s
willingness to enact constitutional reforms that will limit its own
power, and therefore have thought more deeply about how to
mobilize the Chinese public to push reluctant CCP leaders to move
forward.
The Anti-Constitutionalists are the smallest of the three
groups. Their arguments are based on classic socialist legal theory,
which holds that there is no need to use constitutional norms to
constrain either Party or state authority since both the Party and
government institutions, particularly People’s Congresses, are the
voice of the people. Using rhetoric that is redolent of an earlier era
in Chinese political history, they roundly excoriate Western
constitutional systems as tools of oppression of the proletariat, and
repeatedly suggest that those Chinese scholars who do support
constitutional reform are in fact agents of foreign powers.
The debate between these groups was triggered, almost
certainly unintentionally, by China’s top leader, Party Secretary Xi
Jinping.
Xi Jinping called for improved constitutional
implementation in a speech marking the 30th anniversary of China’s
constitution on December 5, 2012.12
While the constitutional anniversary speech has become
something of a political ritual, reformist scholars latched onto it
nonetheless as an opportunity to push for reform. As the debate raged
over several months, members of various ideological camps made
repeated reference to Xi’s remarks. Each camp tried to claim Xi for
itself, even as senior Party leaders, including Xi himself, made
statements and took actions very much at odds with a constitutional
reform agenda.
12

Yinan Zhao, Uphold Constitution, Xi Says, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-12/05/content_15985894.htm (quoting Xi Jinping:
“We must firmly establish, throughout society, the authority of the Constitution and the law
and allow the overwhelming masses to fully believe in the law”).
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In the early months of 2013, the debate moved steadily
rightward, as moderate and liberal reformers found common ground
on a core constitutional reform agenda. 13 This consensus was
interrupted by a left-wing intervention in May. The left-wing attack
featured both Leftist academic voices and, later in the summer,
government officials. Leftist voices were able to occupy most of the
public ideological space throughout the summer with help from state
censors. The censors both pushed anti-constitutionalist pieces in the
state media and online, and also censored pro-constitutional pieces in
all outlets. 14 By late August, the Leftist rhetoric became rather
heated: Leftists accused would-be constitutional reformers of seeking
to overthrow the Communist Party.
Moderates, who often refer to themselves as Socialist
Constitutionalists, did not take this Leftist thrust lying down. Instead,
they responded with a massive number of commentaries and
reasserted their views in scores of articles over several months. Most
of the commentaries could not be published in either official media
outlets or more market-oriented periodicals. By fall, the Leftist push
eased, and the Socialist Constitutionalist moderates were allowed to
have the last word, at least as far as the 2013 constitutionalism debate
was concerned. The conversation had gone full circle, and the status
quo ante was reaffirmed.
The Party’s highly ambivalent response to this wide-ranging
constitutional conversation varied from month to month, mixing
elements of tolerance and repression. For the first few months of 2013,
the academic conversation was allowed to proceed, with only
minimal interference. At the same time, Party censors, ever vigilant
about public involvement in such debates, blocked attempts by
prominent media outlets to weigh in on the debate, most famously in
the so-called Southern Weekend Incident in early January 2013.
When the debate showed signs of garnering too much public attention,
officials warned some of the most high profile participants to move
on to other, less sensitive, topics.15

13 In the Chinese context, conservatives are those who support the Party and often favor
preservation the status quo; they occupy the left side of the political spectrum; those
advocating liberal reforms, including constitutional reforms, are considered to be on the right.
14 Zheng, supra note 8. See also Qian Gang, The Uncertain Death of ‘Constitutionalism,
CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Sept. 2, 2013), http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/09/02/33944/.
15 Author interviews, Beijing, October 2013 (on file with author).
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As always, certain red lines were enforced. When one
Shanghai-based academic issued a critique that touched on sensitive
aspects of Party history, including abuses during the pre-reform era
and the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, he was dismissed from
his university post. This made him the only academic participant in
the debate to lose his job over pro-constitutionalist statements.16
Without doubt, 2013 was the high water mark of
constitutional conversation in China over the past decade.17 But was
the debate mere academic talk, or something more? This article
argues that the Chinese constitutional debate of 2013 served as a
proxy for debate over the future of political and legal reform in
China.18 As such, it offers important insights about shifting views
among Chinese intellectuals about prospects for political-legal
reform.
A close reading of the debate reveals, first and foremost, a
high degree of consensus among legal scholars and intellectuals on
the need for wide-ranging constitutional reforms. For many, calls for
constitutional reform were directly tied to a sense of a growing crisis
in Chinese governance manifested by official corruption, abuse of
power, and social unrest.
Equally important, the debate, and the Party’s response to it,
highlighted the leadership’s view of the constitution as a political tool,
rather than a legal blueprint. Rather than seeking substantive
engagement with those calling for constitutional reform, the Party
sought to manage the debate, using its usual array of tools, including
censorship, promotion of anti-constitutional voices, and, when
needed, direct intimidation, to ensure that the debate stayed within
16

Andrew Jacobs, Chinese Professor Who Advocated Free Speech is Fired, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/11/world/asia/chinese-professor-whoadvocated-free-speech-is-fired.html?_r=0. Although university officials explicitly linked
Zhang’s dismissal to his constitutional writings, others saw his firing as retribution for his
work as a rights lawyer in Shanghai. Author interviews, December 2013 (on file with author).
17 The last such national conversation on constitutional reform took place in 2003, in
the wake of the Sun Zhigang case. See Keith J. Hand, Citizens Engage the Constitution: The
Sun Zhigang Incident and Constitutional Review Proposals in the People’s Republic of
China, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 221 (Balme and Dowdle, eds., 2009).
18 As one commentator put it, “a seemingly academic, terminological debate is actually
a political struggle . . . political interests are using an academic disguise to wage a fierce
battle.” Ge Weikun (葛惟昆), Xianzheng Zhi Zheng, Shi Di’er Ci Zhenli Biaojun Zhi Zheng
(宪政之争, 是第二次真理标准之争) [The Constitutionalism Debate Is the Second
Criterion of Truth Debate], GONGSHI WANG (共识网) [CONSENSUS NET] (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2013121697087.html.
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acceptable limits. In essence, when asked to respond to those voices
arguing in favor of constitutional development, the Party had nothing
politically inspiring or new to say.19 It favored political management
over substantive engagement, even with moderate voices who largely
support the Party.
This study of the 2013 Constitutionalism Debate is not only
of interest to scholars of Chinese politics and law. Because the debate
illustrates the ways in which authoritarian regimes use constitutions
and constitutionalism to enhance their own political legitimacy, it
also contributes to the study of comparative constitutionalism and to
the growing discourse on authoritarian constitutionalism.
While the 2013 Constitutionalism Debate garnered much
attention in China, and also some Western media and scholarly
attention, this article is the first in-depth analysis that looks at the
debate through the theoretical lens of authoritarian constitutionalism.
It is also one of the first in-depth studies of the political uses of
constitutionalism in an authoritarian state, both from the perspective
of the regime and from the perspective of would-be reformist
elements outside the regime itself.
As many scholars have noted, constitutions can in fact play a
number of different roles in authoritarian political systems. This is
contrary to the conventional view that authoritarian constitutions are,
in essence, dead letters. The fact that the Chinese Constitution was
at the center of debate over political reform in 2013 speaks to its
relevance as a political document, one that can and does play a
significant role in elite discourse over the path and pace of political
reform.
From the Party’s perspective, however, the constitution is a
double-edged sword.
It seeks to use the Constitution and
constitutional discourse as a source of political legitimacy: Party
leaders know that constitutional rhetoric is attractive to Chinese
intellectuals, citizens, and even reform-minded Party members.20 But
19

Zheng, supra note 8. Zheng argued that the constitutional debate highlighted the
“decline of official discourse.” In Zheng’s view, “for the past several years, official ideology
no longer produces new theories or concepts,” and is instead focused on maintaining
ideological control, even as Chinese society undergoes rapid change. This emphasis on
control over new thinking aptly describes the Party’s apparent goals in the 2013
constitutional debate.
20 The potential political benefits to a regime of touting its constitutionalist credentials
have long been clear to both scholars and politicians alike. In 1962, the political theorist
Giovanni Sartori noted that, “[i]n our minds, constitution is a ‘good word.’ It has favorable
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it has no interest in political reforms that would institutionalize, and
thus constrain, the Party’s use of power. Therefore, the challenge for
the Party is to constantly present itself as in transition by taking steps
toward constitutional reform without ever actually getting there. It
must present the 1982 Constitution as a genuine blueprint for political
system reform,21 even though it has no intention of making use of it.
I call this the false blueprint paradigm of authoritarian
constitutionalism.
For many, the fact that the CCP sees the 1982 Constitution as
a tool to reinforce its political legitimacy, and not as a roadmap for
political system reform, comes as no surprise. Many scholars have
long argued that the Chinese Constitution is a classic “sham”
constitution, which bears little resemblance to established political
practice in China. 22 Yet, the past several years have seen the
emergence of a new stream of scholarly literature which argues that
China is in the early stages of constitutional development. In the
words of one scholar, “recognizable constitutional structures are, in
fact, beginning to appear in China.”23 I argue that this growing body
of scholarship misunderstands political and legal development trends
in China, and misclassifies those limited reforms that have taken
place as “constitutional” when they are better understood much more
narrowly, as specific, technical legal reforms whose influence on
future constitutional developments are uncertain at best.
These scholars also misunderstand the largely political goals
of the CCP when it engages in pro-constitutionalist rhetoric: for the
Party, the 1982 Constitution is not a means by which power can be
put in a “cage of regulations,” but, rather, a tool for enhancing its own
political legitimacy. The Party, therefore, has to walk its own fine
line. As I document in this article: it must regularly publicly proclaim
that the Chinese state is “in transition” to constitutional governance,
emotive properties, like freedom, justice or democracy. Therefore, the word is retained, or
adopted, even with the association between the utterance ‘constitution’ and the behavioral
response it elicits . . . becomes entirely baseless.” Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A
Preliminary Discussion, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853, 855 (1962).
21 Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONS IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 8 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, eds., 2013). As discussed
in more detail below, Ginsburg and Simpser argue that authoritarian constitutions can serve
as blueprints for future reforms, “describing things not as they are but as they might be.”
22 David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CAL. L. REV. 863 (2013).
23 Michael Dowdle, Of Comparative Constitutional Monocropping: A Reply to Qianfan
Zhang, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 977 (2010).
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without actually arriving at the final destination. 24 I call this the
authoritarian constitutional dilemma.
This article proceeds in five sections. In Part I, I analyze the
existing scholarly literature on authoritarian constitutionalism, and
the ways in which China fits into the authoritarian paradigm. I also
argue that the CCP uses the Chinese Constitution as a source of
political legitimacy, even though it largely fails to adhere to its key
provisions.
In Part II, I describe and analyze the first stage of the debate,
which ran from December 2012 to May 2013. I argue that this first
stage of the debate highlights the ways in which external actors
attempt to use constitutionalist rhetoric to push the Party to engage in
political reforms. I also describe and analyze the constitutional
theories of the top two constitutionalist schools in China, the Socialist
Constitutionalists and the Liberal Constitutionalists.
In Part III, I describe the second phase of this debate, in which
the Leftists, or anti-constitutionalists, came to the fore. Rather than
writing such voices off as irrelevant fringe elements, I argue that such
voices are in fact a key tool of the state used to cool down
constitutional debates before they potentially gain too much
momentum and thus spin out of control. I further argue that the use
of this tool demonstrates the extent to which the Party values its
control over the constitutional document—for the Party, the 1982
constitution may be legally irrelevant, but it is by no means politically
so.
In Part IV, I analyze the responses to this Leftist push, and
describe the wind-down of the 2013 debate. I argue that, from the
Party’s perspective, the goal was to return to the status quo ante, in
which mainstream voices can praise the Constitution and call for
constitutional reform, but must stay within politically acceptable
limits. In the concluding section, I describe the revival of state-led
constitutionalist rhetoric in late 2014. This revival shows that the
Party was anxious to return to legitimacy-enhancing constitutionalist
rhetoric after a long hiatus.

24 Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 5 (2002).
Though Carothers describes the overuse of the term transition in the context of development
of democracy, much of what he describes is also relevant to the study of constitutional
development.
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THEORETICAL CONCERNS: AUTHORITARIAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CHINA

Any debate over the political and legal relevance of the
Chinese Constitution, or of authoritarian constitutions in general,
starts with a simple question: why bother? What positive role can a
constitution play for a regime that, in most cases, has no intention of
following its precepts? 25 Why are constitutions of such value to
authoritarian rulers that virtually every authoritarian regime—to the
neo-totalitarian Kim dynasty in North Korea to the soft authoritarian
regimes in Malaysia and Singapore—adopts one? 26 For its part,
China has adopted four separate constitutions during the sixty-seven
year history of the People’s Republic, and has amended the most
recent 1982 Constitution four times, in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004.
Surely such extensive attention to constitutional drafting and redrafting suggests that authoritarian rulers see some benefit to creating
and maintaining a constitutional document.
Ginsburg and Simpser identify four key functions of
constitutions in authoritarian states: they can act as operating
manuals, billboards, blueprints, and window dressing.27
Not every element of an authoritarian constitutional document
is false. For many authoritarian rules, maintaining a constitutionallymandated allocation of authority between different state actors can be
beneficial, even though doing so may limit the ruler’s freedom of
action. As Ginsburg and Simpser point out, adherence to such a
constitutional structure might lessen the likelihood of friction or even
conflict among different governmental actors, and also encourage
cooperation between intra-state elements by laying out clearlydefined rules of the game. 28 Ginsburg and Simpser call this the
“operating manual” function of an authoritarian constitution.
Admittedly, this function does have some limited
applicability in the Chinese context. Chinese officials, including
many would-be reformists, put great stock in the preeminent
constitutional role of China’s legislative body, the National People’s
25

Ginsburg & Simpser, supra note 21, at 2.
For an extended analysis of whether a genuine form of authoritarian constitutionalism
could exist in certain soft authoritarian regimes, see Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian
Constitutionalism: Some Constitutional Issues, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES 36, 36–49 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, eds., 2014).
27 Ginsburg & Simpser, supra note 21, at 6.
28 Id.
26
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Congress (NPC) The NPC is granted extensive powers under the
1982 Constitution, but given the Party’s complete control of all state
organs and the fact that no state actor can exercise its constitutionallyvested powers independent of Party interference, the operating
manual function to Chinese constitutional practice is only slightly
relevant.
Even those provisions of the Chinese Constitution which are
facially adhered to—those that limit senior officials to two terms in
office, for example—are not fully implemented.29 Throughout the
reform era, it has been the practice of top officials to continue to
exercise power for years, even decades, after they formally
relinquished their posts.30
In both authoritarian and liberal systems, perhaps the most
common function of constitutional documents is the billboard
function. Because a nation’s constitution occupies a prominent place
– at least rhetorically, if not in practice, in authoritarian systems – in
the domestic political order, an amendment that signals a change in
the authoritarian ruler’s governing philosophy or policy direction can
be seen as both authoritative and definitive. Such a change can
capture the attention of both the domestic polity and international
observers. This signals to both audiences that they should look
closely at a change that the regime itself sees as significant.
The CCP has made liberal use of the billboard function
throughout its tenure. The 1954 Constitution, the PRC’s first such
document, emphasized the leadership position of the Communist
Party, signaling the importance that the CCP placed on consolidating
its rule.31 The 1975 Constitution, with its extensive use of radical
leftist rhetoric, is little more than a billboard for various extreme
Cultural Revolution-era slogans. 32 The adoption of the 1982
29 Article 79 of the Constitution, for example, limits the President and Vice-President
of the PRC to two five-year terms. XIANFA art. 79 (China) (1982).
30 It is true, however, that succession politics have become more and more
institutionalized over the past two decades. See Andrew J. Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience,
14 J. DEMOCRACY 6 (2003). However, this institutionalization process has largely been
conducted by the Party rather than the state. If the Party were to alter its approach,
presumably the state structure would follow. More importantly, Party hierarchies, including
informal ones, continue to trump the formal constitutional power structure and rules.
31 William C. Jones, The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 63 WASH. U.
L. REV. 707, 712 (1985) (“[t]he 1954 constitution showed that the new government regarded
itself as firmly established. Military and political control were complete.”).
32 Jerome Alan Cohen, China’s Changing Constitution, 76 CHINA Q. 794 (1978).
Interestingly, Cohen notes that the 1975 Constitution, adopted just as the Cultural Revolution
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Constitution, with its stronger pro-market reform and rule of law
rhetoric, was seen by many observers as the Party’s way of sending a
message to both the Chinese public and to the international
community that China’s post-Mao leadership team was serious about
economic and legal reform.33 Future amendments, including a series
of amendments in 2004 which reaffirmed the state’s role in protecting
human rights and strengthened language relating to private property
rights, 34 generally sought to reinforce these pro-market and legal
reform messages.
Ginsburg and Simpser describe the window dressing role as
“one in which the text is designed to obfuscate actual political
practice.” 35 The rights provisions of the Chinese Constitution, which
are not legally enforceable and which are, in practice, regularly
violated, are one key example of window dressing. One probable
reason why authoritarian constitutions include such provisions is that
they are now considered de rigueur: without them, a constitution is
seen as incomplete. For many, the absence of such provisions would
likely be so glaring as to undermine the entire document.36 In other
words, leaving out such window dressing would subvert the key
legitimacy-enhancing goals of the constitutional drafting project.
Finally, Ginsburg and Simpser argue that authoritarian
constitutions can serve as blueprints for future reforms, “describing
things not as they are but as they might be.” 37 As an example,
Ginsburg and Simpser cite Mexico’s 1917 constitution, which
contained a number of progressive economic and social rights
provisions including rights to land and education for the Mexican
peasantry. Although not legally actionable at the time of their
was winding down, may have incorporated many radical political slogans that, by the time
the Constitution was formally promulgated, were losing favor. Id. at 802–803. Pragmatists
were gaining ground on the radicals within the Party leadership, and they dimmed the lights
on the radical billboard that had been so painstakingly constructed.
33 Hungdah Chiu, The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Rule of Law, 11 REV.
SOCIALIST L. 143 (1985). See also Jones, supra note 31.
34 QIANFAN ZHANG, THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 57 (2012).
35 Ginsburg & Simpser, supra note 21, at 7.
36 See Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & James Melton, The Content of Authoritarian
Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 143 (Tom Ginsburg &
Alberto Simpser, eds., 2014) (“there are very few statistically significant differences between
authoritarian and democratic constitutions when controlling for other factors . . . [this
convergence] indicates a continual process of lagged adaptation by authoritarians, who seek
to model their texts on those of their democratic counterparts”).
37 Ginsburg & Simpser, supra note 21, at 8.
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drafting, these provisions nonetheless may have influenced
subsequent Mexican land reforms which did in fact redistribute a
significant amount of farmland to Mexican peasants.38
One could argue that steps by the CCP to enhance the
authority of the National People’s Congress 39 and the quality and
integrity—if not the independence—of the judicial system 40 are
examples of the application of the blueprint role in the Chinese
context. In my view, the incomplete, even stalled nature of these
reforms means that the blueprint model is somewhat limited in its
application in contemporary China. 41 While state organs exercise
greater authority than they did at the onset of the reform era, it
remains the case that all virtually all important decisions are made by
Party officials, and are then ratified by state organs.42
Also, the notion of a blueprint implies a desire to reach a
certain constitutionally-described destination. As I argue below,
there is little if any evidence to suggest that state-led reforms are in
fact geared toward creating the constitutionally-mandated
governance structure. For that reason as well, the blueprint concept
has limited application in the Chinese context.
That does not mean, however, that the idea of the constitution
as an authoritarian reformist blueprint is irrelevant to the Chinese
context. The fact that the Chinese Constitution lays out a system of
constitutional governance and rights protection similar to fullydeveloped liberal constitutional regimes allows the CCP to use the

James J. Kelly, Jr., Article 27 and Mexican Land Reform: the Legacy of Zapata’s
Dream, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. J., 541 (1994).
39 Michael William Dowdle, Of Parliaments, Pragmatism, and the Dynamics of
Constitutional Development: The Curious Case of China, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1
(2002). See also KEVIN J. O’BRIEN, REFORM WITHOUT LIBERALIZATION: CHINA’S NATIONAL
PEOPLE’S CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (2008).
40 Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA Q. 620-638
(2007). But see Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and
Unfounded Assumptions, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE
OF LAW PROMOTION 69, 74 (Peerenboom, ed., 2010) (arguing that while the independence
of individual judges in the Chinese court system remains weak, the “collective independence
of the Chinese courts has been strengthened through increased budgets, more streamlined
and efficient processes, and efforts to increase the authority of the courts”).
41 See Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011).
42 Christopher K. Johnson and Scott Kennedy, China’s Un-Separation of Powers: The
Blurred Lines of Party and Government, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July 24, 2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-24/chinas-un-separation-powers.
38
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constitutional document as a legitimacy-enhancing tool.43
It is this legitimacy-enhancing function that creates a fifth role.
In this Article, I argue that, for the CCP, and likely for other
authoritarian regimes as well, the constitution has a fifth function that
is related to, but is somewhat distinct from, the other four. That fifth
function is a false blueprint. As noted above, the CCP has shown little
if any intention of actually moving forward with a set of reforms that
would, formally and finally, institutionalize the exercise of political
power within state organs. Instead, the Party seeks to use the
Constitution to legitimize its rule by maintaining the political fiction
that China is transitioning to constitutional governance.
This false blueprint function also highlights another purpose
of the window-dressing language found in authoritarian constitutions.
If an authoritarian constitution is going to be successfully presented
to elite audiences and the general public as a false blueprint, it needs
to contain provisions that lay out a transition to a constitutionalist
governance structure by increasing protections for individual rights.
Without such window dressing language, the state cannot—
disingenuously—point its citizens towards a final outcome.
Maintaining the false blueprint requires the CCP to walk a
very fine line: it needs to regularly extoll the values found in the 1982
Constitution, while obscuring the fact that it has no intention of living
up to them. In other words, it has to talk the talk of constitutionalism,
all while avoiding walking the walk. It needs to be perpetually “in
transition” without ever arriving anywhere. 44 I call this the
authoritarian constitutional dilemma.
Perhaps, unsurprisingly, such a balancing act gets more and
more difficult over time. More and more observers—including
academics, intellectuals, and activists—start to lose faith in the
Party’s commitment to reforms that they pledge to make over and
over again. In other words, authoritarian governments face a
significant temporal challenge of authoritarian constitutional
legitimacy. How (and whether) an authoritarian regime can maintain
43 For an excellent study of the ways in which the CCP uses institutional reform to
enhance its political legitimacy, see Bruce Gilley, Legitimacy and Institutional Change: the
Case of China, 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 259 (2008). Gilley focuses less on the Chinese
Constitution, and more on broader political reforms that, in some cases, dovetail with
constitutional norms. See also BRUCE GILLEY, THE RIGHT TO RULE: HOW STATES WIN AND
LOSE LEGITIMACY (2009).
44 Carothers, supra note 24. Though Carothers is focused on transition to liberal
democracy, many of his insights are relevant to constitutional development within a oneParty system.
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the legitimacy-enhancing benefits of constitutionalist rhetoric over
time is a very interesting question, one that China’s experience, both
in 2013 and over the past thirty years of reform, can shed light on.
For a number of reasons, the CCP faces particularly
significant difficulties in maintaining the public’s belief in the false
paradigm. First and foremost, the CCP has been offering up
Constitutional reform rhetoric for quite some time. For over thirty
years, since the passage of the 1982 Constitution, the CCP has touted
its efforts to develop constitutionalism. Over that time, the Party has
twice proclaimed December 4 as a day of reflection on the importance
of constitutional values. In 1982, the CCP dubbed December 4 as
“Implement Constitution Day,” and in 2014, December 4 became
“National Constitution Day.” In effect, the Party was trying to get
double the political mileage out of the same propaganda tool.
A second difficulty for the CCP in maintaining public buy-in
for the false blueprint is the emergence of a much more diverse and
pluralistic intellectual class that can expose the public to a much
broader range of ideas. In particular, the emergence of a growing
number of liberal constitutional voices—a group that did not really
exist a generation ago—poses a significant challenge to the Party’s
efforts to maintain the public façade of its false blueprint. As the
2013 debate demonstrated, Liberals are often the only group willing
to directly and publicly question the sincerity and validity of the
Party’s constitutionalist rhetoric. But for those liberal voices, it
would be much easier for the Party to maintain its false
constitutionalist credentials.
Finally, the Internet revolution also makes it more difficult for
the Party to maintain public belief in the false blueprint. In
contemporary China, constitutional reform can become a question of
public debate, and views can be expressed—more often than not,
indirectly—about whether or not constitutional reform will move
forward anytime soon. This is exactly what happened in 2013: an
unprecedented number of individual citizens followed the academic
debate online, many expressing their own support for constitutional
implementation as they did so.
Though I discuss only the case of China in this article, the
ideas I raise here, including the false blueprint paradigm, the
authoritarian constitutional dilemma, and the temporal challenge of
authoritarian constitutionalism, are relevant to the study of
authoritarian constitutionalism more generally. The former Egyptian
authoritarian ruler Hosni Mubarak, for example, amended the
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Egyptian constitution in 2005 and 2007, claiming that such reforms
were putting Egypt on the path to fuller electoral democracy.45 He,
too, sought to put forward a false blueprint for constitutional
development. Just days before his ouster in 2011, Mubarak put
forward further constitutional reforms in a last-ditch effort to mollify
thousands of street protesters who demanded his resignation. Those
efforts failed in part because, after three decades in power with little
to show in the way of institutional reforms, Mubarak’s
constitutionalist promises rang hollow. In some ways, Mubarak’s
downfall represented an extreme case of the temporal challenge: he
simply could not maintain the political viability of constitutional
reform rhetoric over time.
A.

The False Blueprint in China: Constitutional Reform or
Rhetorical Tool?

In this section, I argue that failure to understand the role of
the Chinese Constitution as a legitimacy-enhancing false blueprint
has led some scholars to overstate either the potential for
constitutional reform within the existing structure, or the extent to
which constitutional reform (as opposed to legal reform) has already
taken place. While such efforts might seem constructive in that they
seek to highlight the developmental potential of the existing Chinese
Constitution, even within the limits of one-party rule, nonetheless
such approaches can have a downside: they can put a positive gloss
on the status quo, which, in turn, helps the Party legitimize
authoritarian rule.
At the risk of stating the obvious, China has made much
progress on legal reform over the thirty years since the reform and
opening era began. But framing what may often be genuine reforms
as evidence of constitutional development may overstate the nature
of the change, and also falsely suggest a potential for robust
institutional development along constitutional lines. Because the
Party embarked on another round of constitution-based public
messaging in late 2014,46 it makes sense to look very closely at what
45 Kristen Stilt, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes: The Egyptian Constitution of
1971, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 111 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto
Simpser, eds., 2014).
46 Rules of the Party, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
news/china/21629528-call-revive-countrys-constitution-will-not-necessarily-establish-rule-
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reformist efforts have achieved – and what they have not achieved—
over the past decade, and how best to classify those reforms that have
taken place.
In essence, despite the limited progress that China has made
on legal reform over the past decade, China’s constitution remains a
sham constitution,47 one that, on balance, simply does not describe
the system of governance in place in China today. 48 Its rights
provisions remain unenforceable, and the allocation of powers to
different state entities it describes is fundamentally compromised by
Communist Party oversight—not to say usurpation—of the exercise
of those powers. Nor can China’s constitution be called aspirational:
given the lack of a functional interpretative mechanism, it seems
unlikely that constitutional rights provisions that are currently
inactive will be given life anytime soon.49
This may seem like an uncontroversial contention. But in
recent years, a small but growing body of scholarly literature has
questioned the Chinese Constitution’s moribund status. A number of
authors, both Chinese and Western, have sought to draw attention to
various reformist efforts in which the constitution was invoked, in
order to argue that China is taking steps toward genuine constitutional
governance. 50 Michael Dowdle, for example, has stated that
“recognizable constitutional structures are, in fact, beginning to
appear in China,” and cautions that less careful observers of China’s
constitutional development might miss the “powerful potentiality” of
the constitutional document.51
To be sure, the majority of these authors warn that it is too
early to say whether China will continue to develop into a full-blown
constitutional state (even if one that is still authoritarian in
character). 52 They do, however, believe that there is more
law-rules.
47 Law & Versteeg, supra note 22.
48 Xin He, The Party’s Leadership as a Living Constitution in China, in CONSTITUTIONS
IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 245 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, eds., 2014) (“China’s
constitution . . . does not tell how the state actually operates”).
49 Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631 (2009).
50 Dowdle, supra note 23. See also Dowdle, supra note 39, at 2 (“China provides us
with a prime example of significant constitutional development in an otherwise authoritarian
regime . . . [readers should pay attention to] significant evidence of constitutional
development in China”).
51 Dowdle, supra note 23.
52 Stephanie
Balme & Michael W. Dowdle, Introduction to BUILDING
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 2 (Stephanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle , eds., 2009)
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constitutional activity than meets the eye, and that closer scrutiny is
needed.
I believe that these scholars run the risk of overstating recent
developments. I also question whether framing what progress has
been made as truly constitutional in nature makes sense. My concern
is this: constitutional framing may mischaracterize essentially
political debates as legal or constitutional ones; may overstate the
impact and permanence of those changes that have taken place; and
may overstate the capacity of the system for long-term constitutional
development at the institutional level.
To be sure, countries that are in transition to constitutionalism
may not yet possess all of the elements of constitutional
governance. 53 But in order to be in transition, a system must be
actively developing the institutions (judicial or otherwise) that will
interpret the constitution, and apply such interpretations to laws,
regulations, and the state use of power more generally. Such a system
would also be beginning to adopt some set of institutional checks and
balances, so that each branch of government was constrained in its
use of power, both by the constitutional document itself, and by the
exercise of power by the other branches.54 Without these two core
elements – or at least the beginnings of these core elements—then it
is hard to argue that constitutional development is underway.
It is true that, contrary to what once was the established view,
authoritarian systems can in fact successfully integrate into their
governance structures constitutional norms that genuinely constrain
authoritarian rulers. As Barros has shown, the Chilean military junta
under the leadership of Augusto Pinochet subjected itself to
institutionalized constraints; Barros refers to the Chilean experience
as a key example of what he calls “authoritarian self-limitation.”55
(“[w]hat we find in China . . . is a transitional constitutionalism whose future success is by
no means certain, but whose dynamics and possibilities are significantly more interesting
and robust than generally is recognized at present”).
53 Id. See also Tushnet, supra note 26.
54 This application of core elements to transitional constitutions is by no means unique
to this article. Giovanni Sartori, for example, argues that, in essence, a constitution is “a
fundamental law, or a fundamental set of principles, and a correlative institutional
arrangement, which would restrict arbitrary power and ensure a ‘limited government.’”
Sartori, supra note 20, at 855. Though Sartori was speaking of constitutionalist systems in
general, his emphasis on institutions that restrict the use of political power is, I believe, at
the heart of what a developing constitutional system must be aiming for in order to be truly
in transition towards genuine constitutionalism.
55 ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DICTATORSHIP: P INOCHET, THE JUNTA,

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

356

[Vol. 11

In some ways, the Chilean experience sheds light on the lack
of progress in China. While the Chinese Party-state has been forced,
on occasion, to take action in response to external reformist
pressures,56 it has never fully implemented any reforms that would
institutionalize political power along constitutional lines. The past
three decades are rife with examples of half-measures and abortive
reforms that, if they had been zealously implemented and built upon,
might have served to constrain Party power in some meaningful
way.57 The fact that the CCP has not done this speaks to its own lack
of interest in authoritarian self-limitation.
Perhaps the clearest signal of the Party’s lack of interest in
subjecting itself to institutional constraints comes from the Party
itself. In his comprehensive survey of the CCP’s responses to the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Shambaugh shows that the CCP
engaged in an intensive study of the demise of the Soviet system in
order to learn from—and, the CCP leadership hoped, avoid—the
mistakes that Soviet leaders made.58 According to Shambaugh, the
studies carried out by various Party-affiliated think tanks and scholars
identified a range of economic, political, and cultural factors that led
to the collapse of the Soviet Union, not least among them the
“dogmatic, ossified, inflexible, (and) bureaucratic ideology and
thinking” of many top Soviet leaders, with the exception of
Gorbachev.59
Shambaugh also notes that official studies pointed to the
dangers of many of the “Rightist” (liberal) reforms instituted by
Gorbachev, including “advocacy of pluralist ideology,” “negating the
leadership position of the Communist Party,” separating Party and
AND THE 1980 CONSTITUTION 16–28 (2002).
56

See discussion of the Sun Zhigang case, infra at 21–23.
One key example is the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL). Enacted in 1989, the
ALL was meant to serve as a key vehicle for allowing citizens to play a role in limiting abuse
of power by local officials. Yet a range of factors contributed to the effective neutering of
the ALL, and it is largely seen by Chinese scholars as having failed in its initial ambition to
serve as a meaningful constraint on local governments. Some scholars have argued in fact
that the key goal of the ALL is not to make local governments accountable to the people they
serve, but rather to make local governments more accountable to the center. See Xin He,
Administrative Law as a Mechanism for Political Control in Contemporary China, in
BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 144-45 (Stephanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle,
eds., 2009).
58 DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA’S COMMUNIST PARTY: ATROPHY AND ADAPTATION
(2008).
59 Id. at 67.
57
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government functions, and “negating democratic socialism.”60 Real
constitutional reform would invoke all of these concerns, so much so
that, as outlined below, Leftist attacks on proponents of constitutional
reform in mid-2013 would recite very similar charges against their
adversaries. This suggests that the Party has not forgotten what it
perceives as the lessons of the Soviet experience.
Shambaugh’s study shows that, whatever congruence there
may be between specific reforms and a comprehensive constitutional
reform agenda, the end goal of the CCP in enacting those specific
reforms differs fundamentally from the reformist goal of a true
constitutional system in which power is institutionally constrained.61
Shambaugh’s study strongly suggests that the Party believes a
genuine embrace of constitutionalism, rather than reinforcing its own
position, might well lead to the collapse of the one-party system
altogether, just as similar reforms did in the Soviet Union.
B.

Constitutional Rhetoric or Constitutional Reform?

Without doubt, it can be tempting to see various specific
instances of liberal reform as part of a larger picture of long-term
constitutional development. In my own prior writing on Chinese
constitutionalism, I have analyzed attempts by would-be reformers to
“judicialize” the Chinese Constitution, and in so doing to make state
action subject to at least a limited form of judicial review.62 I have
also analyzed cases of judicial innovation by Chinese judges who,
contrary to the general understanding of their quasi-constitutional
role, have applied constitutional norms to specific cases. These
actions, in essence, have created additional legal requirements for

60

Id. at 68–70.
Id. at 3 (“the CCP has zero interest in transitioning to a Western, or even an Asian,
democratic system of competitive parties”). Though Shambaugh does not specifically
address constitutional reforms, his study generally makes clear that far-reaching liberal
reforms that would limit Party authority have been rejected. Constitutionalism would
certainly be in this category.
62 Thomas E. Kellogg, Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics? Constitutional
Development and Civil Litigation in China, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 215 (2009). In particular, I
argued that growing public rights consciousness generated in part by constitutional litigation
might force the Party-state’s hand: “If more and more Chinese citizens begin to see
constitutional rights as both relevant to their own lives and legally enforceable, then the
government may face growing public pressure to respond with more far-reaching reforms.”
Id. at 245-46.
61
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certain litigants not found in Chinese laws and regulations. 63 I have
argued that Chinese courts should be given more space to engage in
more such innovation, and that their actions might serve as a key
element in a renewed push by the Party-state to the build a rule of law
system.64
Though these articles are—I hope—still relevant
contributions to the study of Chinese law, they did not, at least as of
this writing, serve as a predictor of the developmental path of the
Chinese Constitution. In the end, the Party-state chose not to follow
up on the openings highlighted by the cases I described. Indeed, in
one instance, the Supreme People’s Court formally annulled the 2001
Qi Yuling case, which remains the only attempt at full-fledged topdown constitutional reform.65 The failure to build on these successes
speaks to the Party’s reluctance to cross the Rubicon of constitutional
development, and develop a mechanism by which the Party-state is
genuinely circumscribed in its exercise of political power. Until that
Rubicon has been crossed, it will be hard to argue that the Chinese
Constitution is a truly meaningful legal document.
Similarly, many analysts have focused on various incidents in
which constitutional arguments have played a role to argue that the
Chinese Constitution has in fact become operationalized. Ginsburg
and Lin, for example, highlight various cases in which the officials
have made reference to the constitution in order to resolve various
legislative disputes. For them, these cases show that the Chinese
Constitution “plays an increasingly important role within the partystate.”66 In their view, “China’s top legislature has routinely engaged
in interpreting the Constitution during the legislative process, and has
already accumulated a rich body of constitutional norms.”67
It is true that, in the various examples they cite, the
Constitution seems to have played some role. That said, most of the
cases that they cite are of relatively limited significance from a
constitutional development perspective, in the sense that they do not
limit state power or create a new interpretative norm that must be
63 Thomas E. Kellogg, “Courageous Explorers”? Education Litigation and Judicial
Innovation in China, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 141 (2007).
64 Id. at 187–88.
65 Thomas E. Kellogg, The Death of Constitutional Litigation in China?, 9 JAMESTOWN
CHINA BRIEF, no. 7, at 4, 2009, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/cb_
009_7_02.pdf.
66 Yan Lin & Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Interpretation in Lawmaking: China's
Invisible Constitutional Enforcement Mechanism, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 467, 467 (2015).
67 Id. at 469.
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followed in future. In general, in the various cases that Ginsburg and
Lin describe, state authorities use the Constitution to justify state
action; they fail to uncover a case in which the legislature reluctantly
concluded that an action it wanted to take was constitutionally
prohibited.
Ginsburg and Lin also fail to grapple with the (much more
numerous) cases in which the NPC fails to grapple with constitutional
questions raised during the legislative process. In 2014, for example,
the NPC Standing Committee passed a Counter-Espionage Law.
That law, which replaced the 1993 National Security Law, allowed
for the seizure of various assets being used for espionage by Chinese
or international organizations. 68 Such provisions would seem to
implicate several constitutional rights protections, including the right
to be protected against unlawful search,69 and the right to privacy of
personal communications.70
Though the law did state that “counterespionage work must
be carried out in accordance with the law and respect and protect
human rights, as well as protect the legal rights of civil society
organizations,” 71 nonetheless no prophylactic protections were put
into place to ensure that the Law would not be misused by state
authorities to conduct surveillance against or seize the assets of civil
society organizations engaged in various forms of advocacy work.
Indeed, as far as is known, constitutional values failed to influence
the legislative drafting process in any way.
Perhaps most importantly, Ginsburg and Lin overstate the
legal value of constitutional arguments raised during the legislative
process. In fact, such arguments, regardless of their strength, are not
binding on future legislative action.72 For example, Ginsburg and Lin
discuss various cases in which the NPC and the National People’s
Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) have been called upon to
clarify the meaning of constitutional provisions relating to public
68 Didi Kristen Tatlow, China Approves Security Law Emphasizing Counterespionage,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/03/world/asia/china-approvessecurity-law-emphasizing-counterespionage.html.
69 XIANFA art. 39 (China) (1982).
70 XIANFA art. 40 (China) (1982).
71 China passes Counterespionage Law for Comprehensive State Security, XINHUA
(Nov. 1, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/01/c_133759158.htm.
72 Ginsburg and Lin also do not address the question of failure to implement laws, and
the lack of a constitutional mechanism to address failed implementation by local or
provincial governments.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

360

[Vol. 11

ownership of natural resources and land, a key issue in China in
recent years.73 As Ginsburg and Lin themselves point out, in drafting
laws that give meaning to these constitutional provisions, the NPC
and the Standing Committee have taken a largely ad hoc, “case-bycase” approach, and have even given “strikingly different answers”
in response to different laws as to the meaning of public ownership
of different resources.74 No jurisprudence was developed by the NPC
and the NPCSC during the law-drafting process, and even the legal
norms that were codified in laws were not applicable to future laws.
In essence, constitutional arguments put forward during the
legislative process are more rhetorical and political in nature than
they are legal or constitutional. In practice, if the Party decided that
it wanted to reverse recent property law reforms to reclassify the
ownership of various natural resources, or to strengthen the
ownership rights of the state versus private property rights holders, it
would face few legal barriers in doing so. Such action may well be
politically unlikely, but it is by no means legally or constitutionally
impermissible.
Without doubt, Ginsburg and Lin’s examination of the
rhetorical role of the Chinese Constitution in the legislative process
contributes to a fuller understanding of how laws are made in China.
It is also undoubtedly a positive sign that constitutional arguments
carry some rhetorical weight in certain NPC deliberations. But it
seems like an overstatement to suggest that the cases they examine
demonstrate that the NPC and the NPCSC “have been fairly active in
illuminating constitutional meanings in China” 75 or to suggest that
the legislative process has become “a major venue for constitutional
evolution.”76
C.

Popular Constitutionalism Chinese Style? The Limits of
Bottom-Up Reforms

The lack of state-led constitutional activity has led a number
of both Chinese and Western scholars to shift their attention to
Chinese society itself as the likely key force for constitutional
development. Indeed, bottom-up reforms have achieved more than
73

XIANFA art. 9–10 (China) (1982).
Lin & Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 14.
75 Id. at 16.
76 Id. at 18.
74
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top-down efforts over the past several years. For the foreseeable
future, such efforts—often labeled as Chinese examples of “popular
constitutionalism”77 —represent the best hope for new reforms.78
That said, however, labeling those reforms that have been
achieved through social mobilization efforts as moments of meaning
constitutional development is problematic. Given that virtually all of
the reforms that have been achieved by citizen activism are limited in
their broader impact, and are, at the end of the day, not binding on
future Party or state action, the constitutional moniker may not fit.
Take, for example, the 2003 Sun Zhigang case. In April 2003,
the tragic death of a young student named Sun Zhigang in detention
stirred nationwide outrage.79 Sun had been detained under the socalled Custody and Repatriation regulations, which allowed local
officials to detain individuals found residing in places other than their
official place of residence as designated on their household
registration, or hukou.80
After Sun’s death, apparently at the hands of local detention
center officials, made newspaper headlines nationwide, three young
scholars in Beijing—Teng Biao, Xu Zhiyong, and Yu Jiang—
submitted a constitutional review proposal to the NPCSC, which is
formally empowered to interpret the Chinese Constitution. They
argued that the Custody and Repatriation regulations were both
illegal and unconstitutional, in that they violated the Constitution, the
Legislation Law, and the Administrative Punishment Law.81
Within weeks of the scholarly petition, the State Council
announced that it was scrapping the regulations, replacing them with

77

LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004). Kramer argues that, in the early years after its inception in 1789,
the American constitutional republic featured an active and dynamic role for the American
people in constitutional development. It was they, Kramer argues, and not merely the courts,
the Congress, or the executive, who “were responsible for seeing that [the Constitution] was
properly interpreted and implemented. The idea of turning this responsibility over to judges
was simply unthinkable.”
78 Thomas E. Kellogg, Western Funding for Rule of Law Initiatives in China: the
Importance of a Civil Society-Based Approach, CHINESE PERSPECTIVES, no. 3, 2012, at 53,
https://chinaperspectives.revues.org/5954.
79 For an excellent account of the Sun Zhigang case and its aftermath, see Keith J. Hand,
Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms of
Citizen Action in the People’s Republic of China, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 114 (2006).
80 Id. at 120.
81 Id. at 124.
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voluntary measures to aid migrants. 82
The State Council
announcement was rightly hailed as an important victory for Chinese
constitutionalism, and has since been seen as a key milestone in
China’s constitutional development.
It was indeed an important victory, but was it a developmental
milestone? It is true that, as a result of public pressure largely framed
in constitutional language, the Chinese government scrapped a
pernicious form of arbitrary detention that, facially speaking, would
seem to violate Chinese constitutional rights provisions. But for all
of its success, the Sun Zhigang case did not change the meaning of
the Chinese Constitution: it did not, for example, create a
constitutional norm prohibiting arbitrary detention. Though Custody
and Repatriation was scrapped, a number of other forms of arbitrary
detention remained on the books, some of which remain in effect to
this day.83 In addition, the constitutional petition issued by Xu, Teng,
and Yu did not create a new process for petitioning for constitutional
change: the NPCSC has failed to take any formal constitutional action
on all subsequent constitutional petitions addressed to it.
Even in Sun’s case, the Party-state took great pains to deny
the constitutional implications of its own actions. In a historic first,
the NPCSC did formally accept the constitutional review petition
authored by the three scholars. 84 However, rather than publicly
responding to the constitutional petition or stating that it was issuing
an interpretation of the Chinese Constitution, the State Council
merely voided the regulations without any constitutional explication
or explanation whatsoever. While it is true that the Party did initially
allow extensive public discussion of the case online and in the
Chinese media, 85 it likely did so in order to bolster its own
constitutional credentials at a time when its public credibility had
been damaged, rather than as a signal of any willingness to accept
additional reforms.86 The Party’s decision to act through the State
82

Id. at 128.
CHANGING THE SOUP BUT NOT THE MEDICINE: ABOLISHING RE-EDUCATION THROUGH
LABOR IN CHINA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2013), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
documents/asa17/042/2013/en. See also “AN ALLEYWAY IN HELL”: CHINA’S ABUSIVE
“BLACK JAILS,” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2009).
84 Hand, supra note 79, at 149.
85 Keith Hand, Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary China, 7 U. PA. E.
ASIA L. REV. 51 (2012).
86 The government also enacted some minor improvements to the NPCSC’s legislative
review process, in particular by creating a new office to review and resolve legislative
83
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Council rather than the NPCSC also meant that no formal
constitutional precedent was set. This meant that the Party-state
remained free of formal constitutional constraints on its authority.
A better understanding of the Sun Zhigang case might be
arrived a through a study of the underlying political dynamics, rather
than through an emphasis on its legal-constitutional dimensions. In
essence, the Sun Zhigang case was a significant political victory,
which showed, more or less for the first time, that the Party could be
forced to bow to political pressure to enact progressive reforms,
assuming that pressure was sufficiently strong and sustained.
From the Party's perspective, an excessive emphasis on the
legal-constitutional elements of the Sun Zhigang case and other such
cases might obscure what is actually happening. At times the Party is
forced to compromise, but it always preserves its monopoly on
political power and its ability to exercise that power without any
institutional constraints. While it is true that such forms of
negotiation and compromise are an important development,
nonetheless they are just that: forms of political contestation and
negotiation, which, sadly, are all too rare 87 and have virtually no
permanent institutional impact. Perhaps the best that one can say
about the constitutional implications of cases like the Sun Zhigang
tragedy is that they constitute important victories for constitutionally
enumerated values. Nonetheless, they have not brought China any
closer to actual constitutional enforcement. Therefore framing them
as part a process of ongoing constitutional development—rather than
as discrete and often important victories for liberal reformers—may
not make sense.
This is not to say that efforts by academics, lawyers, and
activists are not deeply important—of course they are. Such efforts
have been especially successful in terms of educating the public on
how constitutions should work to limit state power and protect
individual rights. But there are limits to what such approaches can
conflicts. Hand, supra note 79, at 152. Over the first decade of its existence, however, that
office, known as the Bei’an Shi, has failed to play a meaningful role, either in resolving legal
conflicts, or in constitutional development more generally. Chinese constitutional scholar
Guobin Zhu, for example, concludes that “the symbolic significance of the (Bei’an Shi)
reaches farther than the actual significance.” Guobin Zhu, Constitutional Review in China:
An Unaccomplished Project or a Mirage?, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 625 (2010).
87 Qianfan Zhang, A Constitution Without Constitutionalism? The Paths of
Constitutional Development in China, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 950, 968–76 (2010).
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accomplish, first and foremost because they are not easily
reproducible. 88 Given that only extreme miscarriages of justice—
most likely including death—are enough to capture public attention,
the model, such as it is, comes with a high human cost.
Overall, China’s experience over the last decade or more
speaks more to the limits of bottom-up constitutional development
strategies within an authoritarian system than it does to the potential
of such strategies to produce fundamental systemic change. From a
ruler’s perspective, China’s experience indicates that authoritarian
governments have to carefully balance the legitimacy-enhancing
benefits of legal reform with the concern that such reforms could, if
taken too far, eventually limit the authoritarian ruler’s power and
undercut the ruler’s political legitimacy. 89 Such a balancing act
requires constant vigilance, and, when necessary, repressive
retrenchment, to pull back—or if need be, forcibly retire—those
scholars, lawyers, and activists who would push reforms farther than
the Party is willing to see them go.90

III.

THE DEBATE BEGINS: DECEMBER 2012–MAY 2013

The first stage of the debate ran from December 2012 to May
2013, and was, in essence, a conversation between two groups: the
Liberals and the Socialist Constitutionalists. While both Liberals and
Socialist Constitutionalists agreed on the need for constitutional
reform, and even largely agreed on several of the key elements of
constitutional reform—including a constitutional review mechanism,
88 Id. at 968–972 (“[r]ather than improving the institutional capacity of the regime to
prevent abuses of power, the Sun Zhigang model, in essence, provides only a trigger for
initiating a remedial process. The process itself is not only too late, in view of the occurrence
of the tragedy and the inability to prevent conflict, but is seriously limited, as well, in its
capacity to correct the wrongs produced by an anachronistic institutional arrangement
naturally prone to corruption and abuses of power.”).
89 See Fu Hualing et al., Challenging Authoritarianism Through Law: Potentials and
Limit, 6 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 339, 358 (2011) (“there are inequality and injustice [in
China] and people who have suffered are entitled to legal remedies. But a legal mobilization,
as rights lawyers have envisaged and are practicing, is too interruptive to political stability
that is essential for the survival of the Party/state. Injustice as prevalent as it is, can only be
brought to solution at a pace and according to a method with which the CCP is comfortable.
Lawyers cannot be the representative of the interest of the people. Only the Party can.”).
90 One such moment of retrenchment took place in July 2015, when the Party-State
detained or harassed close to three hundred lawyers and activists, in one of the largest attacks
on civil society in China in recent memory. See Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, China
Targeting Rights Lawyers in a Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/07/23/world/asia/china-crackdown-human-rights-lawyers.html.
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enhanced basic rights protections, and greater institutional
independence for each of the three branches of government—they
disagreed on how advance the cause of reform. Most Socialists,
articulating the mainstream academic view, argued in favor of
working through the existing system and sought areas of compromise,
or, even better, agreement with the CCP. Liberals, on the other hand,
expressed skepticism over the willingness of the Party to embrace any
meaningful constitutional reforms, and therefore questioned theories
of change that put the Party, rather than bottom-up social pressure for
reform, at the forefront.
The debate over constitutionalism began on December 4,
2012, with a speech by Xi Jinping on the 30th anniversary of the 1982
anniversary of the Constitution. Speaking to a large audience in the
Great Hall of the People, Party Secretary Xi extolled the supremacy
of China’s constitution and called for greater attention to
constitutional implementation.91
Notably, Xi highlighted the basic rights provisions of the
1982 Constitution, and called for protection of the people’s “personal
rights, private property rights, and other political rights according to
the law.” 92 Xi even obliquely suggested a need for institutional
change, a long-sought goal of reform-minded academics. Xi said
“[w]e must establish mechanisms to restrain and supervise power . . .
power must be responsible and must be supervised.”93
At first glance, such remarks might seem to herald an
important shift: for decades, even as the Party has embraced legal
reform, it has shied away from the creation of institutional
mechanisms that would both restrain its free hand in the exercise of
political power, and also better protect citizens’ rights against state
intrusion.

91 Xi Jinping Pledges to Implement Rule of Law, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 5, 2012), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-12/05/content_15985873.htm (quoting Xi Jinping, “To
fully implement the Constitution needs to be the sole task and the basic work in building a
socialist nation ruled by law”).
92 Xi Jinping (习近平), Zai Shoudu Gejie Jinian Xianxing Xianfa Gongbu Shishi 30
Zhounian Dahui Shang de Jianghua (在首都各界纪念现行宪法公布施行３０周年大会
上的讲话) [Speech in the Capital Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Promulgation
and Implementation of the 1982 Constitution (Dec. 4, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2012-12/04/c_113907206.htm, translation at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2013/05/xi-jingpings-constitutional-vision.html.
93 Id.
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And yet, given the Party’s history of appropriating the
language of law, constitutionalism, and rights for its own purposes,
many observers did not take Xi’s December 4 speech at face value.
In fact, Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, made a similar speech soon after
he took office, celebrating the 20th anniversary of the 1982
Constitution. In that speech, Hu praised the constitution as the
“fundamental guideline” for using state power and, like Xi, called
attention to the constitution’s protection of basic rights. Hu also made
reference to the still-imperfect implementation of the Constitution,
and also hinted at the need for an improved “[c]onstitutional
supervision mechanism.”94 Hu’s pro-reform rhetoric had little effect
on his substantive agenda. When he stepped down in 2012, Hu had
undertaken no meaningful constitutional reforms. In general, Hu’s
ten-year tenure was criticized by many for the lack of progress on
legal reform.95
Despite this history, many observers within China took
advantage of the opportunity afforded both by Xi’s remarks to put
forward pro-constitutional reform arguments. Many reformers also
wanted to take advantage of the fact that, less than a year into Xi’s
tenure as China’s supreme leader, his views on reform were at that
time largely unknown, and the political direction for the coming year
was still uncertain. 96 Though Xi inherited a temporal challenge
created by thirty years of Party inaction on constitutional

94 Hu Jintao ( 胡 锦 涛 ), Hu Jintao Zai Shoudu Gejie Jinian Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xianfa Gongbu Shishi Ershi Zhounian Dahui Shang de Jianghua (胡锦涛在首
都各界纪念中华人民共和国宪法公布施行二十周年大会上的讲话) [Hu Jintao’s Speech
in the Capital in the Great Hall of the People on the 20th Anniversary of the Promulgation
and Implementation of the 1982 Constitution], XINHUA (Dec. 4, 2002), http://news.xinhuanet.
com/newscenter/2002-12/04/content_649591.htm, translated at http://www.humanrights.
cn/zt/magazine/200402004823153254.htm.
95 Ian Johnson & Keith Bradsher, On Way Out, China’s Leader Offers Praise for the
Status Quo, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/world/asia/hujintao-exiting-communist-leader-cautions-china.html. See also Shi Jiangtao, President Hu
Jintao’s Legacy Seen as One of Stability but Stagnation, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 7,
2012), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1031120/president-hu-jintaos-legacy-seen
-one-stability-stagnation.
96 Chen Hongguo (谌洪果), Zhongguo Dangxia de Xianzheng Sichao: Mubiao Ji
Lujing Zhizheng (中国当下的宪政思潮: 目标及路径之争) [Recent National Trends in
Constitutionalist Thought: Debate over Goals and Paths,] CHEN HONGGUO DE GONGSHI
WANG: SIXIANGZHE DE BOKE ( 谌 洪 果 的 共 识 网 : 思 想 者 博 客 ) [CHEN HONGGUO’S
CONSENSUS NET: A THINKER’S BLOG] (June 20, 2013), http://chenhongguo.blog.21ccom.
net/?p=87.
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development, the legitimacy gap was narrowed by the newness of
Xi’s administration.
Xi’s strong anti-corruption rhetoric, which stems from his
first days as Party Secretary,97 also gave liberals hope that Xi was in
fact serious about political reform. On at least one occasion, Xi
publicly linked his own anti-corruption efforts to institutional reforms,
stating that “power must be restricted by the cage of regulations.”98
As with the pro-constitutional rhetoric of his December 4 speech, this
comment would also be repeatedly echoed by would-be
constitutional reformists as evidence that Xi himself—and, by
extension, the Party—was on their side.99
Xi’s December 4 speech was a classic—and, by this point,
almost ritualized—example of the Party’s efforts to use the
Constitution to enhance its legitimacy. With his suggestion that China
“must establish mechanisms to restrain and supervise power,”100 Xi
suggested that he was contemplating institutional reforms that would
fundamentally change the political system in China. In so doing, he
was using the Constitution as a false blueprint, signaling—falsely, if
the time that has passed since the speech is any guide—that he
planned to move forward with institutional reforms that would
operationalize the Chinese Constitution and turn it into a formal legal
document.
One of the first responses to Xi’s speech came from one of
China’s leading media outlets, Caixin. In an unsigned editorial
97 Andrew Hall Wedeman, Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and the Third
Plenum, UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM CHINA POLICY INSTITUTE BLOG (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2013/11/15/xi-jinpings-anti-corruptioncampaign-and-the-third-plenum/ (noting that, Xi’s rhetoric to the contrary, his first year in
office did not yield a significant increase in charges being filed against allegedly corrupt
officials).
98 Xi Jinping Vows “Power Within Cage of Regulations,” XINHUA (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/22/c_132120363.htm. Xi was addressing
the Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the Party’s leading anticorruption unit. In that same speech, Xi went on to say, “Party cadres at various levels
should keep in mind that no one can enjoy absolute power outside the law.” To date,
however, no institutional reforms have been implemented as part of Xi’s anti-corruption
drive.
99 Among many examples, see Weng Yicai ( 翁 一 采 ), Cai Xia: Quanli Ru Long
Guanche Zai Zhizheng Dang Wancheng Lishi Zhuanxing (蔡霞: 权力入笼关键在执政党
完成历史转型) [Cai Xia: The Key to Putting Power in a Cage is the Completion of the
Historic Transition of the Governing Party], SHIDAI ZHOUBAO (时代周报) [TIMES WEEKLY]
(Jan. 31, 2013), http://time-weekly.com/story/2013-01-31/128867.html.
100 Xi, supra note 92.
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published roughly a week after Xi’s remarks, Caixin praised Xi’s
calls for greater attention to constitutional implementation. Caixin
particularly emphasized institutional reforms, including longstanding
proposals for a new Constitutional Court or a constitutional review
committee under the NPC, noting that “[t]he constitution gains its
authority in practice.”101
Foreshadowing controversies to come, Caixin made reference
to Xi’s “Chinese Dream” rhetoric of earlier in 2012, saying that
constitutional development was “also part of the dream.”102
Later that month, another pro-constitutional reform salvo was
fired, one which also made reference to Xi’s December 4 speech. On
December 26, a group of seventy-two prominent scholars, most of
them in the Liberal camp, published a Reform Consensus Proposal
(gaige gongshi changyishu). Signed by leading scholars, including
Beijing University professors Zhang Qianfan and He Weifang,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) scholar Xu Youyu, and
former President of Chinese University of Political Science and Law
Jiang Ping, the Proposal grew out of a meeting held jointly by the
Beijing University Law School Constitutional and Administrative
Law Research Center and the reformist magazine Yanhuang Chunqiu
in late November. 103 The document advocated a six point reform
agenda, including constitutional governance, implementation of
electoral democracy, respect for free expression, deepening of market
reforms, realization of judicial independence, and safeguarding of
constitutional effectiveness, including through the creation and
implementation of an effective constitutional review mechanism.
The Proposal was representative of much of the constitutional
reform debate that would follow in 2013 in four key ways. First, it
linked the need for constitutional reform to serious shortcomings in
101 For China to Rise, so Must Status of Its Constitution, CAIXIN ONLINE (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://english.caixin.com/2012-12-12/100471777.html.
102 See also Interview with Zhiwei Tong, constitutional scholar. Xu Wei (徐伟), Tong
Zhiwei: “Yixian Zhizheng” Jiu Yao Quanmian Luoshi Xianfa (童之伟:“依宪执政”就要
全面落实宪法) [Tong Zhiwei: “Constitutional Governance” Requires Full Implementation
of the Constitution], SHIDAI ZHOUBAO ( 时 代 周 报 ) [TIMES WEEKLY] (Dec. 13, 2012),
http://time-weekly.com/story/2012-12-13/128260.html. Tong suggests that, in essence, Xi’s
remarks show that the new CCP leadership favors constitutional reform.
103 Lin Lan ( 林 兰 ), Zhongguo 70 Duo Zhiming Xuezhe Lianming Tuichu Gaige
Gongshi Changyi Shu (中国 70 多位知名学者联名推出《改革共识倡议书》) [More
Than Seventy Noted Chinese Scholars Jointly Release “Reform Consensus Proposal”],
RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE (Dec. 26, 2012). The RFI report includes the full text of
the Reform Proposal, which was subsequently blocked on websites inside China.
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China’s current governance structure, and painted a picture of abuse
of power, corruption, and lack of transparency that could only be
addressed through far-reaching and fundamental institutional
reforms.104 The Proposal eschewed academic jargon and theoretical
abstractions to focus on a vision for China’s future reform path that
could be appreciated by both scholars and by a broader general
audience.
Second, the Proposal pointed to the urgency of reform,
suggesting that time was in fact not on the new leadership’s side. “If
the systemic reform that Chinese society so urgently needs is again
thwarted, then stagnation, official corruption, and social discontent
will lead China to the verge of crisis,” the Proposal warns. “China
will once again lose an opportunity for peaceful reform, and sink into
the turbulence and chaos of violent revolution.”105
Third, the Proposal, though aimed at the new leadership under
Xi Jinping, highlighted the importance of broad public consensus,
and the role of the Chinese people in pushing for bottom-up reform.
“Without reformist pressure from outside the system, those inside the
system will lack a motive drive for reform,” the Proposal argues.
The fourth way in which the Proposal was representative of
the reformist proposals that would follow in 2013 was that it indicated
a high degree of consensus among academics and intellectuals in
favor of reform. Though the debate between the Socialist
Constitutionalists and the Liberals, described in more detail below,
highlighted a number of areas of disagreement, nonetheless, there
was broad agreement on the need for truly meaningful constitutional
reform.
Other pro-Constitutional reform statements followed, many
of which also made use of both Xi’s December 4 speech and his
“Chinese dream” rhetoric. In early January 2013, the pro-reform
magazine Yanhuang Chunqiu issued a New Year’s Greeting entitled
“The Constitution is a Consensus for Political System Reform.”106 In
104

Id. (stating that the Proposal notes that the failure to make progress on political
reform has meant that “official corruption, the misuse of public power, and the growing gap
between rich and poor, and other such phenomenon have grown more critical with each
passing day, leading to intense public dissatisfaction”).
105 Id.
106 Xianfa Shi Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige de Gongshi (宪法是政治体制改革的共识), [The
Constitution is a Consensus for Political System Reform], YANHUANG CHUNQIU (炎黄春秋)
[ANNALS OF THE YELLOW EMPEROR] (Jan. 2, 2013), translated at http://cmp.hku.hk/
2013/01/02/30203/.
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it, the magazine’s editors gave various examples of how some of
China’s most pressing political, legal, and social challenges could be
addressed by full implementation of specific constitutional provisions.
Following in the footsteps of the Consensus Reform Proposal,
Yanhuang Chunqiu called for institutional reforms, citing prior
reform proposals calling for the creation of a constitutional review
system or a constitutional court. Within days of the op-ed’s
publication, Yanhuang Chunqiu’s website was shut down, though it
would later be allowed to reopen.107
The drafters of the Reform Consensus Proposal and of the
media pieces that followed were determined to make immediate use
Xi’s December 4 speech to push for constitutional reform. In
particular, the Proposal was a paradigmatic example of the ways in
which the regime’s own constitutionalist rhetoric can be used to push
a liberal, reformist, anti-authoritarian line. With its warning of
impending crisis and calls for a bottom-up push for constitutionalism,
the Proposal avoided the trap of reinforcing the Party’s
constitutionalist credentials, and instead kept its focus on the need for
action. Such a push-and-pull between the Party and reformist
intellectuals, with constitutionalism as the key vehicle, would
become a key element of domestic political debate in 2013.
A.

The Southern Weekend Controversy

The difficulties that Yanhuang Chunqiu faced over its New
Year’s editorial paled in comparison to the travails of the longtime
liberal stalwart newspaper Southern Weekend. Its editors also penned
a New Year’s greeting highlighting the need for constitutional reform.
In fact, the piece was originally titled “Chinese Dream, Dream of
Constitutional Governance.” That piece was essentially rewritten by
provincial Party censors, leading to a standoff between Southern
Weekend staff and provincial authorities, as well as carnival-like
protests by members of the public in front of Southern Weekend’s
Guangzhou offices.108

107 Verna Yu, Yanhuang Chunqiu Website Closed down After Editorial on Constitution,
S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1120153/
yanhuang-chunqiu-website-closed-down-after-editorial-constitution.
108 Edward Wong, Protest Grows over Censoring of China Paper, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7,
2013), http://m.cn.nytimes.com/china/20130108/c08southern-updated/en-us.
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The incident began with an extensive back-and-forth between
rank-and-file Southern Weekend editors and the editor-in-chief
Huang Can over the content of the paper’s annual New Year’s
message to readers.109 In years past, the New Year’s message had
focused on the need for liberal reforms, and the original draft of the
2013 New Year’s message, penned by editorial writer Dai Zhiyong,
was no exception. Working in consultation with provincial
propaganda officials, editor-in-chief Huang extensively watered
down Dai’s draft, altering the meaning of the piece considerably,
while nonetheless keeping a few kernels of liberal reformist
sentiment.
Had the watered-down version been published without
additional changes, the episode would likely have passed unnoticed
as just another example of routine censorship in the Chinese media.
But the piece was reworked further. These further edits were
attributed to provincial propaganda chief Tuo Zhen, a former
journalist and longtime propaganda official known for his
conservative views. 110 This final round of edits fundamentally
altered the meaning of the piece, scrubbing it entirely of its original
liberal tone. In essence, the last round of edits turned the editorial
into a propaganda piece that praised the Party for its successful
pursuit of the “Chinese dream” of national greatness.111 This direct
intervention by propaganda officials was seen by many as a new level
of censorship, a form of heavy-handedness that crossed the line.
A side-by-side comparison of the two editorials highlights in
very dramatic fashion the very different ways in which external and
internal actors use constitutional concepts to craft very different
messages, and to pursue very different goals.
Dai Zhiyong’s original draft, “China’s Dream, the Dream of
the Constitution,” made an eloquent and relatively moderate plea for
109 For an extensive account of the editorial process from an authoritative source, see
Qian Gang, “Why Southern Weekly Said ‘No,’” CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Jan. 11, 2013),
http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/01/11/30623/.
110 Id. (suggesting that the final changes were made not by Tuo Zhen, but by his deputy
Yang Jian. Moreover, propaganda officials ordered other changes—to pictures, to headlines,
and to other pieces—in addition to the changes made to the New Year’s editorial).
111 A number of journalists—some of them ex-Southern Weekend staffers—noticed
immediately that some lines in the New Year’s Day editorial were borrowed directly from
official propaganda pieces in outlets like the People’s Daily. David Bandurski, A New Year’s
Greeting Gets the Axe in China, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Jan. 3, 2013), http://cmp.
hku.hk/2013/01/03/30247/.
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constitutionalism. 112 Dai makes four key points. First, he
appropriates Xi Jinping’s “dream” rhetoric, calling on his readers to
realize the Chinese “dream of freedom, the dream of
constitutionalism.” Second, Dai reframes modern Chinese history as
a series of—at times catastrophic—failures to realize this dream.
Third, he places the CCP itself within this historical context,
implicitly linking the Party to other pre-1949 ruling elites who also
failed to realize the constitutionalist dream. In so doing, he suggests
that contemporary problems are linked to the absence of
constitutionalism, and can only be solved through constitutional
development.
Dai’s final point is perhaps his most subtle one and also
among the most important. By framing his piece as written from the
perspective of, and directly to the Chinese people themselves, Dai
suggests that responsibility for achieving the “Chinese dream” of
constitutionalism lies not with the Party, but with the people
themselves. The people must “act right now with our own hands” in
order to achieve it.
The revised editorial turns Dai’s piece on its head. Rather
than refashioning official Chinese dream rhetoric to serve a genuine
liberal constitutionalist agenda, the revised piece instead embraces
and trumpets the Party line, quoting Xi Jinping’s call to realize the
Chinese dream of “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Rather
than drawing historical parallels with the Qing Dynasty and the
Republican era, the revised editorial places contemporary China—
and, by extension, the ruling CCP—in the privileged position of
having come “closer to this dream than we ever were.” The single
mention of constitutionalism suggests progress and effectuation,
rather than any sense of falling short.
Half as long and, at times, platitudinous and dull, the revised
editorial fails to engage or inspire. It reads as tired filler, as
propaganda, and the basic errors that were written into the speech
added insult to injury to those Southern Weekend journalists who
were upset by its appearance in the pages of what once was China’s
most progressive news media outlet. The low quality of the piece,
112

The Southern Weekly Affair: No Closer to the Chinese Dream?, FREE SPEECH
DEBATE (Feb. 20, 2013), http://freespeechdebate.com/en/discuss/the-southern-weeklyaffair-no-closer-to-the-chinese-dream/. Both the original piece and the final published
version were translated and published online by the Free Speech Debate project at Oxford
University. Unless otherwise noted, all of the quotes from the editorial are taken from this
translation.
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and the intense negative reaction it generated, speaks to the very real
challenge that the Party faces in creating constitutional messages that
can resonate with the public.
When the revised editorial hit the newsstands on January 3,
2013, the reaction was immediate and intensely negative: top
reporters and editors were shocked over the wholesale reworking of
the piece, which took place outside of normal editorial channels, and
deeply dismayed by its propagandistic tone. When Southern
Weekend editor Huang Can took steps to have the paper publicly—
and, of course, falsely—assert that the editorial was in fact written by
Southern Weekend staff, editors and reporters rebelled, and called for
an investigation of what they saw as unprecedented and unacceptable
interference. Some reporters published an open letter calling for Tuo
Zhen’s resignation.113 Others went on a short-lived strike.
If the response to the doctored editorial had been limited to
the paper’s staff, there is no doubt the Party would have considered it
a regrettable but largely minor incident. However, news of the
incident spread quickly across China on the Internet and made waves
across Chinese society. Within days of the incident, protestors began
to congregate outside of Southern Weekend’s Guangzhou office,
many of them toting signs calling for press freedom and other basic
rights.114 Interestingly, many of the protestors carried signs calling
for the implementation of China’s constitution. For many, the street
protests were an extremely rare example of a public protest in defense
of a basic constitutional ideal.
For millions of average Chinese, the incident played out
online. Despite the best efforts of Chinese censors to keep the
incident out of the mainstream press and off of the Chinese internet,
an uncountable number of individual Chinese followed the standoff
closely, avidly reading extensive Chinese-language and English113 Teddy Ng, Former Southern Weekly Journalists Want Propaganda Chief Tuo Zhen
to Go, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/
1120199/former-southern-weekly-journalists-want-propaganda-chief-tuo-zhen-go.
The
open letter strongly and publicly criticized Tuo Zhen by name, an extremely rare occurrence
in China. The journalists referred to Tuo’s actions as “ignorant and excessive,” and also
called for his resignation. “In this era where we see growing open-mindedness, his actions
are muddle-headed and careless,” the journalists wrote. “Tuo is unable to hold his current
position, and should be forced to resign and make an open apology.”
114 Edward Wong, Protest Grows over Censoring of China Paper, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7,
2013), http://m.cn.nytimes.com/china/20130108/c08southern-updated/en-us. One banner
carried by protesters read, “Get rid of censorship. The Chinese people want freedom.”
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language international media reports on the incident. Chinese actress
Li Bingbing mentioned the incident to her 19 million followers on
Weibo, the Chinese version of Twitter. Actress Yao Chen also sent
an indirect message of support to Southern Weekend to her 31 million
followers.115
On January 6, a constellation of more than two dozen of
China’s top intellectuals, academics, journalists, and lawyers, many
of whom had written for Southern Weekend during its heyday as
China’s top intellectual journal, issued an open letter praising
Southern Weekend for its contributions to reform in China. They
echoed the call for Tuo Zhen’s dismissal. 116 Several hundred
intellectuals signed a second open letter calling for stronger legal
protection of free expression. Others, including the journalism
faculty at Nanjing University 117 and students at Guangzhou’s Sun
Yat-sen University, 118 also spoke out in support of Southern
Weekend’s rank-and-file journalists and editors. Overall, public
interest in the controversy was very strong.
With cultural figures, prominent public intellectuals,
journalists, and even some more mainstream academics all lining up
on the side of Southern Weekend—and, at least in some way, in favor
of constitutionalism—it seemed clear that the Party propaganda
apparatus was losing the war of words, and that its loss was damaging
the Party’s credibility. Provincial officials moved quickly to
negotiate an end to the standoff, which, in essence, guaranteed a
return to “normal” standards of oversight and censorship. Public
115

Id.
For a partial translation of the open letter, see David Bandurski, Inside the Southern
Weekly Incident, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Jan. 7, 2013), http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/01/07/
30402/.
117 Teddy Ng, Former Southern Weekly Journalists Want Propaganda Chief Tuo Zhen
to Go, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
article/1120199/former-southern-weekly-journalists-want-propaganda-chief-tuo-zhen-go.
118 Ian Johnson, Test for New Leaders as Chinese Paper Takes on Censors, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/world/asia/chinese-newspaperchallenges-the-censors.html. In their open letter, the students linked the struggle at Southern
Weekend to the lack of legal status of the Chinese Constitution:
It is because we have yielded that power has become unbridled and
wanton; it is because we have been silent that the Constitution has
become a rubber stamp. Our yielding and our silence has not brought
a return of our freedom and our radiance. Quite the opposite, it has
brought the untempered intrusion and infiltration of rights by power.
David Bandurski, Students Speak out Against Censorship, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Jan. 6,
2013), http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/01/06/30375/.
116
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protests in front of the Southern Weekend office died down, and the
public moved on to other issues.
To be sure, a key element of the Southern Weekend
controversy was the way in which it demonstrated to Party leaders
the growing tension between rank-and-file journalists and the
massive Party-run censorship system. 119
Tensions between
journalists and their managers had been growing for years, as Party
propaganda officials moved to plug loopholes in the media
management apparatus. 120 In particular, officials looked to
strengthen pre-publication censorship and ensure that journalists
could not beat the system and run stories that ran counter to Party
interests. This in turn further alienated journalists, who resented
having more and more stories altered or even killed.121 The tensions
were especially high at Southern Weekend, as the Party moved
conservative officials into key Party posts both at Southern
Weekend’s parent, the Nanfang Daily Group, and at the Guangdong
Province propaganda department, which oversees the paper.122
From a constitutionalist perspective, the incident
demonstrated how evocative constitutional rhetoric can be and how
quickly it can spread from elite circles to the general public. Public
attention can, in turn, lead to public protests, long an anathema for
the Party. The controversy illustrated the importance of Party control
over the debate on constitutionalism: failure to maintain control could
subvert Party efforts to publicly position itself as a proconstitutionalist, reformist actor. In essence, the effect of the
Southern Weekend incident was the exact opposite of what the Party
usually attempts to achieve through constitutional-themed public
messages: instead of bolstering the Party’s legitimacy through the
trumpeting of the constitution as a false blueprint, the Southern
Weekend episode damaged the Party’s reputation by exposing its
119 Qian Gang, Why Southern Weekly?, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Feb. 18, 2013),
http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/02/18/31257/.
120 For an excellent account of the long-term trends that led to the Southern Weekend
controversy, see David Bandurski, How the Southern Weekly Protests Moved the Bar on
Press Control, 13 JAMESTOWN CHINA BRIEF, no. 3, at 6, 2013, https://jamestown.
org/program/how-the-southern-weekly-protests-moved-the-bar-on-press-control/.
121 Id.
122 Interestingly, Guangdong’s new propaganda chief, Tuo Zhen, was himself once a
respected up-and-coming journalist. See Teddy Ng, Tuo Zhen, Crusading Journalist Turned
Guangdong Propagandist, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/article/1120156/tuo-zhen-crusading-journalist-turned-guangdong-propagandist.
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censorship apparatus to public view and ridicule. The incident also
placed the Party in the position of publicly subverting, rather than
upholding, constitutional values.
The controversy convinced the newly-installed Party
leadership that it needed to take a firmer line on public debate, and
reassert greater Party oversight and control over the “ideological
sphere.”123
A central element of this reassertion of control was the
issuance by the Party’s Central Committee General Office of the socalled Document No. 9, in April 2013.124 That directive, officially
titled “Communique on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere,”
called on Party cadres to guard against seven “false ideological trends,
positions, and activities,” including “promotion of Western
constitutional democracy” and “promoting ‘universal values’ in an
attempt to weaken the theoretical foundations of the Party’s
leadership.” Document No. 9 made clear that the Party viewed calls
for constitutional reform as potentially subversive attempts to “use
Western constitutional democracy to undermine the Party’s
leadership [and] abolish the People’s Democracy.”125
Just a month later, the first of many Leftist anti-constitutional
pieces was published in the Party publication Red Flag Manuscripts.
Official efforts to tamp down the liberal pro-constitutionalist debate
through the use of Leftist rhetoric had begun.
B.

Beyond Southern Weekend: The Intellectual Debate

Even from the debate’s first moments, it was clear that there
was a fair amount of common ground between the Socialists and the
Liberals. Most fundamentally, both sides agreed that pro-reform
123 Author interviews (on file with author). See also Chris Buckley, China Takes Aim
at Western Ideas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/
asia/chinas-new-leadership-takes-hard-line-in-secret-memo.html. The Times reports that,
after Document No. 9 was issued, provincial-level officials made speeches directly linking
the Southern Weekend Incident to the issuance of Document No. 9 and the subsequent
crackdown on bloggers, journalists, lawyers, and others.
124 The document began circulating online in Chinese several weeks after its
promulgation. See Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation, CHINAFILE (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.
125 Although it did not refer to Southern Weekend by name, Document No. 9’s reference
to “some people [who] still use the phrase ‘constitutional dream’ to distort the Chinese dream
of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” would seem to be a clear-enough reference
to the Guangzhou paper and the spiked pro-constitution editorial. Id.
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voices were growing stronger.126 In late January, Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences economics researcher and prominent public
intellectual Zhang Shuguang noted that “the voices calling for
political system reform are quite strong.”127 At around the same time,
activist and intellectual Wang Debang argued that “today, almost no
one doubts that China must move toward democracy!”128 Other more
mainstream scholars made similar points in more measured tones.129
Another recurring theme was the “urgency” of reform, and the
“anxiety” of many intellectuals over what might happen if political
reform continued to take a back seat to economic reform.130 As one
scholar noted, the urgency of reform had itself become a point of
consensus.131 The urgency and the anxiety stemmed from concerns
over China’s current situation, and the perception that certain
problems, including corruption, abuse of power, and the protection of
“vested interests” at the cost of the public good, had become all too
common. Public outrage over official abuse of power was being kept
at bay only through ever-growing investments in an unchecked state
stability apparatus dedicated to “stability maintenance” at all costs.132

126 In early January, journalist and commentator Ye Tan noted that China’s New Year’s
message for 2013 seemed to be “appeals for constitutionalism from all sides.” Ye Tan (叶
檀), Shichang Jingji Yu Fazhi Shuishou Shi Xianzheng Guojia Jichu (市场经济与法治税收
是宪政国家基础) [A Market Economy and a Rule of Law Tax Collection System Are the
Basis for a Constitutional Nation], FT CHINESE (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.ftchinese.com/
story/001048350/?print=y.
127 Zhang Shuguang (张曙光), Zhongguo Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige de Tupokou (中国政治
体制改革的突破口) [The Breakthrough Point for Political System Reform in China],
UNIRULE INST. ECON. (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.unirule.org.cn/index.php?c=article&
id=988 (article deleted by censors, but now available at this source).
128 Wang Debang (王德邦), Minjian Qiubian Yu Guanfu Yingbian Xuanxiang Xia de
Zhongguo Zhuanxing Lujing (民间求变与官府应变选项下的中国转型路径) [Choosing
Between Public Calls for Change and the Official Need for Change on China’s Transitional
Path], BOXUN WANG (博讯网) [BOXUN NET] (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.boxun.com/news/
gb/pubvp/2015/02/201502171154.shtml#.V_nFCsnJKT8.
129 Wang Xiao (王霄), Shi Gan Xing Bang, Shou Zai Xing Xian (实干兴邦，首在行
宪) [For solid work and a rising nation, the first step is constitutional expertise], AI SIXIANG
(爱思想) [LOVE THOUGHT] (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/60727.html.
130 Yuan Xunhui (袁训会), Zheng Yongnian Haiwai Kan Shibada: Kaiqi Zhongguo
Xiandai Zhengzhi Yuannian (郑永年海外看十八大:开启中国现代政治元年) [Zheng
Yongnian Looks at the 18th Party Congress from Overseas: Opening the New Era in Modern
Chinese Politics], GUANCHAZHE (观察着) [THE OBSERVER] (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.
guancha.cn/ZhengYongNian/2013_02_02_124768.shtml.
131 Hua, supra note 11.
132 Weng, supra note 99. Prof. Cai noted that, since the 1990s, government policy had
created the “three rapids”: rapid economic growth, rapid spread of corruption, and the rapid
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Finally, many pieces suggested significant potential costs for
the Party if it did not take advantage of the current window of
opportunity and push forward with reforms sooner rather than later.
“If the Party does not resolutely push forward with political system
reform, the intensification of social conflict might cause the ruling
party to miss the opportunity for reform,” Central Party School
scholar Cai Xia told an interviewer in early February. 133
Constitutional scholar Jiang Ping estimated that the Party had a fiveyear window in which to pursue reform; if it failed to take action
during that five year “golden period,” then China’s future will be
“difficult to predict.”134 Constitutional scholar Hua Bingxiao gave
the Party a bit more time, suggesting that the Party had a decade-long
window of opportunity, after which, if no action was taken, it might
“lose its ruling status,” and the nation would see “social division,
economic decline, political upheaval, and national disintegration.”135
1.

Socialist Constitutionalism

The Socialist Constitutionalists represent the mainstream of
academic constitutional thinking in China. At least within the halls
of the academy, Socialist Constitutionalists vastly outnumber
Liberals, who in turn outnumber the small handful of Leftist AntiConstitutionalists.
Perhaps the core belief of Socialist Constitutionalists is that
the existing 1982 Constitution can in fact be implemented, and that
genuine constitutional reform can peacefully—even productively—
coexist side by side with the one-party system. Socialists will fully
acknowledge the CCP’s leadership position, and have even urged
other scholars to do the same, as a key element of building support

divergence of social interests. These “three rapids” led to the creation of vested interests,
who are now among the chief barriers to political reform.
133 Id.
134 Jiang Ping (江平) et al., Li Xian, Xing Xian, Xianzhi—Weilai Shinian Xianzheng
Poju ( 立 宪 , 行 宪 , 宪 治 —— 未 来 十 年 宪 政 破 局 ) [Establish Constitutionalism,
Implement Constitutionalism, Constitutional Governance: The Constitutional Collapse of
the Next Decade], XIANGGANG SHANG BAO (香港商报) [HONG KONG COMMERCIAL DAILY]
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2013030178048.html.
135 Id.
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within the Party for constitutional reforms that would, in essence,
institutionalize and put limits on its use of political power.136
Whereas others might see contradiction, the Socialist
Constitutionalists see a textual reality that must be harmonized, and
also, perhaps more importantly, a political reality that cannot be
wished away. They acknowledge that modern constitutional practice
frowns upon the idea of naming and empowering a specific political
party within the text of the constitutional document itself.
Nonetheless, they would accept the reality that the 1982 Constitution
enshrines the leadership position of the Chinese Communist Party,
while at the same time putting forward a governmental structure in
which state power is exercised through institutions, and in which all
citizens are equal before the law.
Socialist Constitutionalists are also more deeply enmeshed in
theory than the Liberals: they have spent much time and effort
attempting to reshape traditional understandings of socialist legal
theory, which generally does not acknowledge the possibility of
violations of individual rights by the Socialist state, thus obviating
the need for judicial review. 137 The emphasis on theory often
involves a heavy reliance on key quotations from early Socialist
thinkers, including Marx and Engels, as well as from leading Chinese
revolutionaries, including, most commonly, Mao and Deng.138
This emphasis on theory partially explains the Socialists’
particularly vociferous response to the Leftists: the Leftists launched
a frontal attack on the theoretical framework that the Socialists had
so painstakingly constructed over many years. Furthermore, the
Leftists fundamentally challenged the relevance of the Socialists’
intellectual project of packaging constitutional norms and values in
ways that would make them acceptable—both intellectually and

136 Tong Zhiwei, Talking Constitutionalism No. 3: A Supplemental Exposition of the
Socialist Constitutionalist Concept, GONGSHI WANG (共识网) [CONSENSUS NET] (June 4,
2013) (“in a word, I urge the Chinese intellectual community not to challenge the CCP’s
long-term constitutional governing position, and support the CCP’s leadership”).
137 Kellogg, supra note 62.
138 One method of reconciling the contradictions is to present the evolution of the legal
system as a series of theoretical innovations, led by different generations of Chinese leaders.
See, e.g., Wang Zhenmin (王振民), Xianfa Zhengzhi: Kai Wanshi Taiping Zhilu (宪法政
治:开万世太平之路) [Constitutional Politics: Starting on the Generational Road of Peace],
GONGSHI WANG BOKE [共识网博客] [CONSENSUS BLOG] (Aug. 22, 2013), http://blog.
ifeng.com/article/29793109.html.
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politically—to the CCP. In some ways, the Liberals were off to one
side of this conversation.
Another key characteristic of Socialist Constitutionalists is
their view of constitutional change as a state-directed, top-down
process. One Socialist scholar referred to constitutional reform as the
Party’s “unshirkable historic mission,”139 another called it the Party’s
“mission.”140 Despite the lack of progress on constitutional reform
since the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, Socialists, for the most
part, continue to maintain public support for, and publicly profess
their belief in, a Party-led reform process.141
It is unclear whether this professed faith in the Party’s
willingness to eventually undertake constitutional reform is genuine,
or whether it is more pragmatic in nature. As leading Socialist
Constitutionalist scholar Tong Zhiwei pointed out, the leading
position of the CCP is an “objective fact,” one that cannot be changed
as the result of anyone’s expression of opinion to the contrary.
Furthermore, Tong argues, the Party’s accumulation of “economic
resources, political resources, and state coercive force,” as well as
139 Hua Bingxiao ( 华 炳 啸 ), Lun Fanxianzheng de Wuchi yu Qienuo: Huiying
Fanxianzheng Guandian Xilie Zhi Er (论反宪政的无耻与怯懦:回应反宪政观点系列之
二 ) [On the Shamelessness and Gutlessness of the Anti-Constitutionalist Faction:
Responding to the Anti-Constitutionalist Views, Part Two in a Series], HUA BINGXIAO DE
BOKE (华炳啸的博客) [HUA BINGXIAO BLOG] (July 8, 2013), http://huabingxiao.blog.caixin.
com/archives/58851.
140 Cai Xia (蔡霞), Tuijin Xianzheng Minzhu Yinggai Shi Zhongguo Gongchandang de
Zhizheng Shiming (推进宪政民主应该是中国共产党的执政使命) [Pushing forward
Democratic Constitutionalism Should be the Chinese Communist Party’s Governing
Mission], GONGSHI WANG (共识网) [CONSENSUS NET] (May 30, 2013), http://www.21
ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2011110648239.html. See also Li Liangdong (李良栋
), Zhizhengdang Yinggai Shanyu Lingdao Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige (执政党应该善于领导政
治体制 改革 ) [The Governing Party Should Adeptly Lead the Reform of the Political
System], XUEXI SHIBAO (学习时报) [STUDY TIMES] (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.21ccom.
net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2013080589108.html. Prof. Li, a political scientist at the
Central Party School, argued that the reform process in China has entered into an
“exceedingly complex” period, and that further reform was “both urgent and formidably
difficult.” Li called on the Party to lead the reform process, and play the role of “designers
and organizers of reform,” despite the fact that such reforms would face “unprecedented
resistance” from “vested interests unwilling to see their interests harmed.” Perhaps because
of Professor Li’s strong Party credentials, the piece was widely circulated within China.
141 Other scholars have pointed out that the Socialists also view their own role as central.
As Xi’an-based scholar Chen Hongguo put it, the Socialist Constitutionalists “are full of
self-confidence, they believe that only the Socialist Constitutionalists can provide a workable
path for constitutional implementation, and so therefore carry with them a martyr’s spirt of
sparing no efforts to reach comprehensive and effective constitutional implementation.”
Chen, supra note 96.
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support from key social and interest groups, means that its position is
incontestable.142 This logic would seem to suggest mere acceptance
of the status quo, rather than firm intellectual agreement and
support.143
Perhaps because the Socialists view the Party’s senior
leadership as a key audience, they are more interested than the
Liberals in political positioning. Many Socialist Constitutionalists
will go to great pains to distance themselves from “Western-style”
constitutionalism, instead insisting that they are offering something
distinctly Chinese, or at least something distinctive to the People’s
Republic of China. 144 They also draw repeated parallels between
their theories and the so-called “socialist market economy,” the
process of market-based reforms that began in China in the early
1980s.145
For many Socialist Constitutionalists, then, the key to
constitutional reform is a signal from the Party that it is ready to move
forward. That is why many Socialist Constitutionalists latched onto
Xi Jinping’s December 2012 comments on constitutional
implementation: they hoped that those comments were in fact just the
signal that they had been waiting for.146 In an interview less than two
weeks after Xi’s December 4 speech, for example, Tong Zhiwei
praised Xi’s comments on constitutional implementation, calling
them a “positive sign.”147
In terms of their substantive agenda, the Socialists support a
program that is paradoxically both conservative and a potentially farreaching radical departure from the status quo. In an attempt to put
142

Tong, supra note 136.
In that same piece, Tong expresses a certain “understanding” for his Liberal
colleagues who have reservations about fixing the leadership position of the CCP within the
Constitution itself. The arrangement does, at times, lend itself to a certain “moodiness,”
Tong acknowledges, as it fails to satisfy “man’s inherent instinct to pursue freshness.” Id.
144 Wang, supra note 138.
145 Hua, supra note 139.
146 Wang Xiao (王霄), Shi Gan Xing Bang, Shou Zai Xing Xian (实干兴邦，首在行
宪) [For solid work and a rising nation, the first step is constitutional expertise], Speech at
the Second meeting of the Constitutionalism and Socialism Forum, AI SIXIANG (爱思想)
[LOVE THOUGHT] (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/60727.html.
147 Tong Zhiwei (童之伟), Yixian Zhizheng Yaoqiu Quanmian Shishi Xianfa (“依宪执
政”要求全面实施 宪法) [Tong Zhiwei: For “Public Administration According to the
Constitution,” We Must Fully Implement the Constitution], TIME WEEKLY (时代周报)
[SHIDAI ZHOUBAO] (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_
2012121873161.html.
143
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forward a plan that is at least at the outer edge of feasibility, Socialists
have come up with a more minimalist definition of constitutionalism.
This definition jettisons elements—like direct elections for nationallevel leaders and multi-party democracy more generally148—that the
CCP has made clear it cannot accept. The CCP often criticizes more
liberal scholars for adding too many elements to the list, thereby
making the question of constitutional implementation more
complicated than it otherwise might be.149
For Shanghai-based scholar Tong Zhiwei, constitutionalism
consists of three basic elements: a written constitution; limits on state
power and protections for basic rights; and constitutional
implementation, with a special emphasis on implementation of basic
rights protections. 150 By this logic, because China has a written
constitution, because this Constitution enumerates basic rights, and
because it delineates the specific powers of different branches of
government, China is close to full constitutionalism. Tong and other
Socialists would argue it has the structure; it merely lacks for
implementation of that existing constitutional structure. In other
words, by the Socialists’ reading, China is only one step away from
constitutional governance: if a constitutional review mechanism is
created, then China’s transition to constitutionalism will be complete.
For many Socialist Constitutionalist scholars, identification
of potential areas of reform that are both meaningful and politically
acceptable to the CCP leadership is a key intellectual task. Whenever
the Party has experimented with different reforms, such as local-level
elections, open budget processes, and the development of OGI
regulations, Socialists have trumpeted their constitutional
implications, and have pushed – largely unsuccessfully, it must be
said – for their broader adoption.
Tong Zhiwei himself has put forward a four-pronged reform
plan, one that combines longstanding reformist elements with some
new ideas. He proposes that the Party adopt legislative measures to
protect basic citizen rights, with a special focus on the rights of
citizens to “criticize and supervise” official behavior; establish a plan
148

Wang, supra note 138. See also Cai, supra note 3.
Xu Qianchuan (徐 潜川 ), Tong Zhiwei, Wang Tingyou, He Weifang: Liu Wen
Xianzheng Sanfang (童之伟 汪亭友 贺卫方:六问 “宪政三方”) [Tong Zhiwei, Wang
Tingyou, He Weifang: Six Questions for the Three Parties of Constitutionalism], CAIJING
(July 15, 2013), http://www.aisixiang.com/data/65769.html.
150 Tong, supra note 136.
149
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for expansion of direct elections for People’s Congresses at higher
levels than currently countenanced; strengthen judicial
independence; and adopt institutionalized measures for strengthened
external oversight of the police and for “strictly constraining the
activities of the state security apparatus so as to practically improve
protection citizens’ freedom of person and freedom of
communications.”151
This four-pronged agenda illustrates the conservative and
progressive elements of the Socialist Constitutionalist reform agenda.
At least the first three of these proposals have been put forward
repeatedly by intellectuals and, at times over the past twenty years,
by the Party itself, which means that they are within the realm of
political possibility. At the same time, if actually implemented, these
reforms would constitute a significant step forward in terms of reform
of China’s political system, and would dwarf the minimal progress
on political system reform over the past two decades.
Some more liberal scholars have suggested that one key flaw
of the Socialist Constitutionalists’ approach is that they do not engage
directly with the human rights situation in China: they are too
theoretical and not sufficiently engaged with the actual situation in
China. They emphasize theoretical concerns and debate the merits of
various reform models, while leaving aside—at least in their public
writings—any detailed analysis of the political barriers to
constitutional reform.
2.

The Liberals

Before the Leftists joined the debate in May 2013, the reform
conversation was primarily between the Socialist Constitutionalists
and the Liberal Constitutionalists. Often referred to as the PanConstitutionalists or Enlightenment Liberals, the Liberals include in
their camp a number of prominent public intellectuals, including
Beijing University professors He Weifang and Zhang Qianfan;
Shanghai-based legal scholar and lawyer Zhang Xueyou; political
scientist Fang Shaowei; and regional security expert Zhao Chu. In
general, the Liberals favor more far-reaching constitutional reforms,
and more openly embrace Western models of state organization.
They question the appetite of the Party for meaningful structural
reform of the political system, and therefore are skeptical of the
151

Id.
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prospects for further progress under the existing constitutional
framework. Often, Liberals are more likely to look at debates over
constitutional development as more strategic than substantive.
Lurking behind many of their public commentaries are questions
about how to address political barriers to constitutional reform.
The Liberals also display a deeper commitment to core
constitutional norms and values,152 and as a result, are less likely than
the Socialists to suggest compromise, for example on the need for
direct elections as part of multi-party constitutional democracy, or on
the need to end the CCP’s constitutionally-enshrined leadership
position as a key prerequisite of constitutional reform.
Indeed, just as the Socialists seek to harmonize seeming
textual contradictions, the Liberals often call attention to them,
arguing that they demonstrate the very real difficulties of meaningful
reform under the existing structure. 153 They also note that the
Constitution enshrines various doctrines, such as NPCSC oversight
of the court system, which cut against fundamental constitutional
norms, such as separation of powers.154 Liberals also point to the raft
of laws and regulations that would seem to violate basic rights
protections, including rights to free speech, free association, and
freedom of religion, as further evidence of the legal contradictions
that would have to be resolved if constitutional development were to
proceed.155
These textual contradictions, combined with the lack of
progress on political reform in recent years, have led many Liberals
to openly express doubts over the strategic wisdom of the Socialists’
approach of, in essence, trying to convince the Party that
constitutional reform can move forward without putting the core of
the one-party system at risk. Many Liberals fear that that the Party
152

Chen, supra note 96.
While the most significant contradiction has to do with the enshrining of the CCP’s
leadership position within the Preamble of the Constitution itself, there are other concerns.
Beijing University scholar He Weifang points to the various provisions of the Chinese
Constitution (specifically Articles 8, 12, and 13) that cover state and private ownership of
land. He points out that different forms of property in China are, in practice, often accorded
very different levels of protection by the state. Such Constitutional provisions, He argues,
“are not in accordance with the spirit of constitutionalism.” Xu, supra note 149.
154 Id. Article 67 of the Chinese Constitution gives the NPCSC the power to “supervise”
the work of the SPC. Article 104 grants similar powers to provincial and local People’s
Congress Standing Committees. Article 128 states that the SPC shall be “responsible to” the
NPCSC.
155 Id.
153
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has lost interest in meaningful political reform,156 not least because
such reform would limit their own power.157 Instead of focusing on
Party-led, top-down reform strategies, the Liberals argue, would-be
reformers should focus on bottom-up approaches to reform, engaging
the broader public and helping to build a social consensus in favor of
constitutional development.158
In contrast to the Socialists, the Liberals are more likely to
define constitutionalism more broadly, and to see the component
parts as mutually-reinforcing, and therefore all equally vital. The key
components most often mentioned include separation of powers,
judicial independence, protection of basic rights, and civilian control
of the military.159 Prominent Liberal Zhang Qianfan put forward a
six-point “consensus” agenda for structural reform, which included
democratization of the CCP; elections for key Party and government
posts; protection of free speech; market liberalization reforms;
professionalization of the court system; and substantive
implementation of the constitution.160
Finally, Liberals are more likely to link the need for
constitutional reform more directly to the overall country context, and
to openly embrace the political, rather than purely academic, aspects
of reform.161 In an August 2013 speech at the pro-reform think tank
Tianze Economic Research Institute, Liberal scholar Zhang Qianfan
argued that the reformist approach of the past two decades, one which
156 Zhao Chu (赵楚), Shexian Lun de Da Shenhua (社宪论的大神话) [The Great
Mythologies of the Socialist Constitutionalists], ZHAO CHU DU JIA PINGLUN (赵楚独家评论)
[ZHAO CHU EXCLUSIVE COMMENTARIES] (June 6, 2013), http://zhaochuboke.blog.163.
com/blog/static/2073191472013563359853/. Zhao points out that the Leftist attacks on
Socialist Constitutionalism have “once again clearly pointed out that the dictatorial system
does not tolerate constitutionalism.”
157 Du Daozheng (杜导正), Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige Yinggai Zhongbu Qianjinle (政治体
制 改 革 应 该 中 步 前 进 了 ) [Political System Reform Should be Striding Forward],
YANHUANG CHUNQIU (炎黄春秋) [ANNALS OF THE YELLOW EMPEROR] (Sept. 12, 2012),
http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2012091967982.html.
158 Zhao, supra note 156. In Zhao’s view, constitutional transition in China needs the
input of scholars, but “really it is a political movement,” one that, in accordance with modern
constitutionalism, should be rest on a broad-based social contract in favor of constitutional
reform. See also Du, supra note 157.
159 Chen, supra note 96.
160 Zhang Qianfan (张千帆), Zhongguo Dangqian Zuida Weixian Shi Quezhi Tizhi
Gongshi (中国当前最大危险是缺乏体制共识) [Contemporary China’s Greatest Danger
is that it Lacks Systemic Consensus], MENGSHAN YEYI DE BOKE ( 蒙 山 野 逸 的 博 客 )
[Mengshan Yeyi Blog] (Mar. 19, 2013), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_9c28f2160101gwt5.
html.
161 Zhao, supra note 156.
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emphasized economic reforms while paying little if any attention to
political reform, was deeply flawed.162 That approach, Zhang argued,
had generated huge external costs, doing deep damage to China’s
environment, its natural resources, its social institutions, and even to
public morale. Under such circumstances, Zhang argued, official
corruption would inevitably skyrocket, creating an additional barrier
to eventual political reform.
In Zhang’s view, China’s current path, of maintaining a
narrow focus on economic reform without addressing very real
shortcomings in China’s political system, is unsustainable. “If we
continue with this approach to reform,” Zhang stated flatly, “the costs
of corruption will go higher and higher.” Without a shift in direction,
Zhang argued, China’s future prospects would be grim:
My conclusion is this: without a larger environment
of constitutional governance, without at least some
basic improvements in the political and legal
environment, our economic reforms will continue to
follow a distorted path, and in the end will lead to
outcomes that none of us want to see.163
The only solution, Zhang argued, was constitutionalism. In
essence, Zhang argued, “without constitutional governance, reform is
nonsense.”
For Zhang and other Liberals, constitutional reform is the
best—perhaps the only—means to avoid future calamities. In a
March 2013 essay, Zhang argued that, in the absence of wide-ranging
reforms, China was facing a potential “crisis.” This word was used
by a number of scholars throughout the 2013 debate.164
Because they view constitutional development as an
inherently political, rather than academic, process, the Liberals often
call for broader social consensus on political reform. They more
directly address key strategic questions of top-down versus bottomup change, and are more likely to see a need for broad-based social
mobilization to push for reform. Accordingly, many prominent
162

Zhang Qianfan (张千帆), Meiyou Xianzheng, Gaige Jiu Shi Chedan (没有宪政，
改 革 就 是 扯 淡 ) [Without Constitutional Governance, Reform is Nonsense], XINWEN
LAOBING DE BOKE ( 新 闻 老 兵 的 博 客 ) [VETERAN JOURNALIST BLOG] (Aug. 2, 2013),
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5974c0620102e7nl.html.
163 Id.
164 Zhang, supra note 160.
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Liberals seek to engage a broader public audience beyond the halls of
the academy.

IV.

STAGE TWO OF THE DEBATE: THE ANTICONSTITUTIONALIST WAVE

Leftist anti-constitutional statements are not totally unknown
—there are some precedents, including a 2004 piece by an obscure
scholar named Chen Hongtai, 165 for example. But by and large,
Leftist views have been largely absent from mainstream legalconstitutional debate in China over the last three decades. 166 The
return of Leftist constitutional argument in some of the most
prominent theoretical journals in the country took many scholars by
surprise.
The arguments put forward by the Leftists were often taken
directly from classic Socialist legal theory, and thus cannot be said to
be particularly innovative or insightful. In many ways, their
arguments reflect Chinese constitutional scholarship of the prereform era. Not surprisingly, then, the response from more
mainstream scholars, many of whom view themselves as offering the
very innovations to Socialist legal theory that would allow China to
move forward with Constitutional development, were dismissive of
the first wave of Leftist writings that began to appear in late May and
June 2013.
That dismissiveness, however, represented a missed
opportunity: though it is true that the main arguments of the Leftist
scholars are of limited intellectual value, nonetheless, various pieces
do contain some content that may indirectly shed some light on the
views of some in the Party leadership on the dangers of liberal
constitutional values to the Party’s continuing hold on political power.
165 Qian Gang, The Uncertain Death of ‘Constitutionalism,’ CHINA MEDIA PROJECT
(Sept. 2, 2013), http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/09/02/33944/. Chen’s piece appeared in the
November 2004 issue of the obscure theoretical journal TRENDS IN THEORETICAL RESEARCH,
and was titled, “Views and Reasons Why the Term ‘Constitutionalism’ Cannot Be Used.”
In November 2005, the journal PARTY HISTORY ran an anti-constitutional piece by Xin Yan,
entitled “‘Constitutionalism’ Cannot Be Taken as a Basic Political Concept for Our Country.”
Both pieces mirrored arguments put forward by Yang Xiaoqing and other anticonstitutionalists in 2013.
166 That said, elements of Leftist arguments have remained a key component of
Communist Party discourse, even as other, more modern strains of thought have also made
their way into Party debates.
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The first the anti-constitutionalist piece was penned by legal
scholar Yang Xiaoqing, whose article, “Comparative Research on
Constitutionalism and the People’s Democratic System,” 167 was
published in the Party journal Red Flag Manuscripts on May 22.
Yang’s “Comparative Research on Constitutionalism and the
People’s Democratic System” is in some ways a walk backwards in
time, to the pre-reform era, when China’s legal academy was still
dominated by Socialist legal theory, which held that Western-style
constitutionalism was in fact a tool of suppression, used by economic
elites—the capitalist class—to oppress society as a whole, and
maintain control of the political system. Quoting liberally from Marx,
Engels, and Lenin, as well as Chinese leaders like Mao, Deng, and
Jiang Zemin, Yang argues that “the key systemic elements and
principles of constitutionalism only belong to capitalist dictatorship,
and are not part of the Socialist People’s Democratic System.”
Though Yang was repeatedly excoriated for engaging in
Cultural Revolution-style political invective, in fact her piece merely
regurgitated the basic tenets of Socialist legal theory, and applied
them, one by one, to the supposed advantages of the key components
of Western constitutional systems including parliamentary
democracy, separation of powers, judicial independence, and state
control of the military. Her review of these elements led her to
conclude that China’s Socialist legal system is in fact superior, and
that such elements are “not suitable” for China.
Interestingly, save for passing references to the Southern
Weekend controversy and liberal scholars who advocate for more
wholesale reforms, Yang’s main target in the piece was the Socialist
Constitutionalist camp. She argued that this camp was “pandering to
the political might and rhetorical hegemony” of Western
constitutionalism.
And yet, Yang did not fully reject Western constitutional
theory and practice as completely irrelevant to the Chinese context.
Instead, she noted that many Socialist systems have adopted
secondary elements of the liberal democratic constitutional system,
including market economics, protection of human rights, freedom of
167 Yang Xiaoqing (杨晓青), Xianzheng Yu Renmin Minzhu Zhidu Zhi Bijiao Yanjiu
(宪政与人民民主制度之比较研究) [Comparative Research on Constitutionalism and
People’s Democratic System], HONGQI WENGAO (红旗文稿) [RED FLAG MANUSCRIPTS]
(May 22, 2013), http://www.qstheory.cn/hqwg/2013/201310/201305/t20130521_232618.
htm.
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religion, and legislative oversight of government budgets.168 But, she
argued, the adoption of these elements by China had led some
Socialist Constitutionalist scholars to argue that China has already
become a Socialist Constitutional state. Yang warned that this
argument is very dangerous; it could “handcuff” China and lead it
down the path of the Soviet Union, toward inevitable state collapse.
Over the next few weeks, Yang’s piece was followed by
others in a similar vein. On May 29, for example, the Party
theoretical journal Party Constructs ran a piece by one Zheng
Zhixue—a pen name169—entitled “Recognizing the Essential Nature
of ‘Constitutionalism.’”170 That piece repeated many of the same
basic arguments advanced by Yang Xiaoqing, including the core
argument that constitutionalism is a “capitalist” political and
economic system unsuitable for Socialist China.
At the same time, however, Zheng’s piece was not an all-out
attack on Socialist Constitutionalists. Zheng notes that “intentions
(of the Socialist Constitutionalists) are good,” even if their ideas are
“vague,” “specious,” and “erroneous.” To adopt constitutionalism as
a core value, Zheng argues, would be to “fall into a rhetorical trap.”
Zheng decried what he saw as the faddishness of Chinese study of
Western political and legal theories, and warned of the dangers of
“being led around by the nose” by the “capitalist” theory of
constitutionalism. Such actions, Zheng stated flatly, would be
equivalent to “intellectual surrender.”
Perhaps Zheng’s most interesting point is his suggestion of a
slippery slope associated with constitutional reforms. Zheng argued
that, if China adopted constitutionalism or even socialist
constitutionalism as a key guiding concept, then leading liberal
constitutional theories will “spread unchecked,” leading to “increased
confusion” in the broader ideological sphere. “Foreign and domestic
hostile forces” would use the additional space created to “gradually
compel us to use liberal constitutionalist theory” and to implement
168 Interestingly, Yang cites media freedom as a secondary characteristic of democratic
constitutionalist systems that have not been adopted by Socialist countries, an implicit
commentary on the role of the media in China and its relationship to the Party’s propaganda
apparatus.
169 The true identity of the author of the Party Constructs piece was the subject of some
speculation among Chinese academics.
170 Zheng Zhixue ( 郑 志 学 ), Renqing Xianzheng de Benzhi ( 认 清 宪 政 的 本 质 )
[Recognizing the Essential Nature of ‘Constitutionalism’], DANGJIAN ( 党 建 ) [PARTY
CONSTRUCTS] (May 29, 2013), http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0529/c83855-21652535.
html.
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“so-called Socialist constitutionalism,” and would thus “interfere
with the implementation and direction of our nation’s political system
reform.” This suggestion of constitutional reform as an all-ornothing proposition may in fact explain the reluctance of many in the
Party to embrace even modest changes to the political system over
the past twenty years.
The third key piece in the first wave of anti-constitutional
writings was Wang Tingyou’s essay, also published in Red Flag
Manuscripts, entitled, “A Few Thoughts on the Problem of
Constitutionalism.”171 Perhaps unsurprisingly given his post at the
People’s University Marxism Institute, Wang’s essay focused heavily
on Marxist theory and did not spend much time attacking proconstitutional advocates. He did, however, note that Western nations
hope to use constitutionalism as a “breakthrough point,” one that can
“progressively abolish the leadership of the Communist Party and the
Socialist system.”
In some ways, the particular thrust of the Leftists’ arguments
mattered less than the politics behind them. There were various hints
that the Leftist attacks may have been orchestrated by senior Party
officials, or at least been launched with their blessing. The timing of
the attacks, roughly one month after the issuance of the so-called
Document No. 9, led many to wonder whether there was in fact a
connection between the Party’s anti-constitutionalist rhetoric as
articulated in Document No. 9, and the leftist wave started by Yang.
Second, the use of key Party theoretical outlets, including Red Flag,
Red Flag Manuscripts, and Party Constructs, strongly suggested the
involvement of the Party ideological apparatus. Finally, the fact that
these articles circulated widely online, while pro-constitutional
voices were often censored, indicated that Party propaganda officials
were playing an active role in managing the debate.172
It seems clear, then, that the May-June spate of Leftist articles
bore the Party’s fingerprints, even if the identity of the specific Party
leaders pushing the Leftist line remained unknown. And yet, if the
Leftist push had stopped there, it likely would have been brushed off
171 Wang Tingyou (汪亭友), Dui Xianzheng Wenti de Yixie Kanfa (对宪政问题的一
些看法) [A Few Thoughts on the Problem of Constitutionalism], HONGQI WENZHAI (红旗文
摘) [RED FLAG MANUSCRIPTS] (June 12, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/201306/09/c_124840106.htm.
172 Qian Gang, The Uncertain Death of ‘Constitutionalism,’ CHINA MEDIA PROJECT
(Sept. 2, 2013), http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/09/02/33944/.
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by moderates as a temporary aberration, as nothing more than the
frustrated musings of the Party’s Leftist camp. The fact that the
attacks were penned by a group of marginal scholars, often writing
under assumed names, only reinforced the notion that the attacks in
May and June were not a serious threat, and were probably not
connected with the highest reaches of the Party leadership.173
After a lull in July, the Leftist attacks were renewed in early
August. The second wave of attacks was much sharper, and much
more political, than the first.
The renewed push began with three pieces in the People’s
Daily overseas edition by one Ma Zhongcheng, an alias.174 The first
piece, published on August 5, was entitled, “Constitutionalism is
essentially a weapon in the war of public opinion.” That piece focused
less on abstruse theoretical arguments over the relationship between
Marxism and constitutionalism. Instead, the article focused much
more heavily on politics, and in particular, on political attack. Ma
made clear that scholars advocating for constitutionalism in fact were
looking to “overthrow” the socialist system, and therefore needed to
be watched.
Ma’s first opinion piece also differed from the earlier
academic Leftist pieces in its increased emphasis on the role of the
United States in helping to support constitutionalist, and even
socialist constitutionalist, discourse, and in his drawing of
comparisons between the 2013 Constitutional debate and the collapse
of the Soviet Union. According to Ma, concepts like “democratic
socialism” and “socialist constitutionalism” are viewed by the CIA as
the “most effective weapons” in the war against socialism.175

173

Id.
Ma Zhongcheng (马钟成), Meiguo Xianzheng de Mingbu Fushi (美国宪政的名不
副实) [American Constitutionalism in Name Only], RENMIN RIBAO HAIWAI BAO (人民日报
海外报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY OVERSEAS EDITION] (Aug. 6, 2013), http://paper.people.com.cn/
rmrbhwb/html/2013-08/06/content_1278768.htm. Ma Zhongcheng may be a homonym for
“loyalty to socialism,” and the anonymous author may have ties to Leftist scholars who
supported Bo Xilai before his downfall. Ping Chang, What Propaganda Against
Constitutionalism Tells Us About China’s ‘New’ Government,” S. CHINA MORNING POST
(Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1297833/whatpropaganda-against-constitutionalism-tells-us-about.
175 Ma also argues that Western NGOs and foundations are part of the CIA’s efforts to
win the ideological war, and to spread “American liberal economics and legal studies”
around the world. Ma mentions in particular a 1987 Ford Foundation project on global
comparative constitutionalism. Id.
174
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Ma also draws an implicit parallel between Socialist
Constitutionalist advocates and the reformist leaders of the Soviet
Union in the 1980s, suggesting that seemingly moderate systemic
reforms can lead quite quickly to state collapse. Once again, a Leftist
article reflects very real debates and concerns within the Party elite,
that Constitutionalism is one of a number of Liberal reforms that
represent the first step in a slippery slope toward the end of one-Party
rule.
Ma’s second piece, “American Constitutionalism in Name
Only,” focused more closely on what Ma referred to as the “myths”
of American constitutional governance.176 In particular, Ma argued
that the US constitution, rather than being an instrument for the
protection of individual rights, instead acts as a tool for capitalist
domination of the working classes; it therefore compares unfavorably,
Ma points out, with China’s constitution, which enshrines the
dictatorship of the proletariat.
The third piece in Ma’s series, “In China, Pushing So-Called
Constitutional Governance Can Only Be Like Climbing a Tree to
Catch Fish,” also put forward the argument that socialist
constitutionalism was even more “misleading” than Liberal
constitutionalism. 177
Further, the piece linked Socialist
Constitutionalist theory to reform theories that led to the collapse of
the Soviet Union. The piece concluded by reiterating the leadership
position of the Chinese Communist Party, as enshrined in the
Constitution’s preamble.
This initial spate of articles significantly upped the rhetorical
ante, and also signaled a higher degree of Party involvement: unlike
the series of May articles, written largely by academics in Partyaffiliated theoretical journals, the early August pieces were shorter,
and used more pugnacious, and overtly political, language. They
were also published in more prominent outlets, including the
People’s Daily overseas edition. These pieces were one step closer
to a formal Party statement on constitutionalism.178
176

Id.
Ma Zhongcheng (马钟成), Zai Zhongguo Gao Suowei Xianzheng Zhineng Shi
Yuanmu Qiuyu (在中国搞所谓宪政只能是缘木求鱼) [In China, Pushing So-Called
Constitutional Governance Can Only Be Like Climbing a Tree to Catch Fish], RENMIN
RIBAO HAIWAI BAO (人民日报海外版) PEOPLE’S DAILY OVERSEAS EDITION (Aug. 7, 2013),
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2013-08/07/content_1279445.htm.
178 Banyan, Climbing Trees to Catch Fish: a Curious To-and-Fro About China’s
Constitution Bodes Ill for Political Reform, ECONOMIST (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.
177
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The Ma Zhongcheng series of articles was followed by two
pieces of somewhat obscure origin: “’Constitutionalist’ Theory
Interferes With and Misleads China’s Reform,” by Zheng Li, and
“The Constitutionalist Wave is Challenge to the Spirit of the 18th
Party Congress,” by Gao Xiang. 179 Those pieces, published on
September 20th and 21st, continued the attacks on both Liberal
Constitutionalist and Socialist Constitutionalist camps, often using
even harder-edged language than Ma Zhongcheng.
And yet, some observers held out hope that the May-June
academic articles and the August spate of opinion pieces were not in
fact a formal intervention from the top Party leadership, but rather an
unsanctioned attempt by a no doubt well-connected and influential
group within the Party to stir the ideological pot. Hong Kong
University-based scholar and media analyst Qian Gang, for example,
pointed to the fact that all of the anti-constitutionalist pieces appeared
in outlets just below the highest, most authoritative level.180 If the
Party leadership wanted to send a clear message, Qian argued, why
not issue a clear and authoritative statement in the Party’s flagship
People’s Daily?181 Further, Qian argued, the rather crude rhetorical
style of some of the pieces suggested that the Party’s most senior
ideologues were in fact not the authors of the August attacks.
Those hopes were dashed only a month later with the release
of a series of strongly-worded attack pieces by provincial Party
secretaries and provincial propaganda chiefs, many of them published
in the most authoritative Party outlets, including People’s Daily itself.
This wave of articles, which included pieces by thirty-one
senior provincial-level officials, stemmed from an August 19 speech
by Xi Jinping at a National Propaganda Work Conference on the

economist.com/news/china/21583697-curious-and-fro-about-chinas-constitution-bodes-illpolitical-reform-climbing-trees. See also Benjamin Carlson, What’s China Got Against the
US Constitution?, GLOBAL POST (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/
news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130811/china-democracy-political-reform.
179 Both pseudonymous authors were identified as researchers at the Oceanic Security
and Cooperation Research Institute; both saw their pieces published first on the far-left
nationalist website Hanjiang Online before being reposted to the website of the Party
doctrinal magazine Seeking Truth.
180 Qian Gang, The Uncertain Death of ‘Constitutionalism’, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT
(Sept. 2, 2013), http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/09/02/33944/.
181 Id. As Qian pointed out, the People’s Daily overseas edition is not the same as the
mainland edition of the People’s Daily.
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importance of the “public opinion struggle.” 182 Though initial
reporting on the speech, which has not been made public, used a more
moderate tone in summarizing Xi’s remarks, later reports
characterized the speech as having a harder edge, and many linked
the phrase “public opinion struggle” directly to Xi’s remarks.183
It seems clear, then, that the Leftist push that began in May
was orchestrated by the CCP from the very beginning as a
coordinated effort to manage the public conversation on political
reform. The fact that the Leftist push was undertaken with the
approval of senior Party leaders, most likely including Xi himself,
speaks to the need of the Party to maintain control over the
Constitution. The Party cannot allow it to be subverted by others for
what it sees as anti-Party purposes. In essence, it cannot maintain the
Constitution as a legitimacy-enhancing false blueprint if others are
able to either successfully push for it to become a legally-binding
document, or successfully expose the Constitution as a legally
meaningless sham constitution.
Many of the provincial-level responses, which must have
been coordinated by central authorities, made specific mention of
constitutionalism as a “Western” tool to infiltrate China and subvert
the rule of the CCP. One representative piece, written by Hubei
Province propaganda Minister Yin Hanning, referred to
constitutionalism and universal values as “beautiful lies,” and urged
close attention to the “rhetorical traps” set by Western states.184
Though Minister Yin’s piece—along with the pieces by other
provincial-level ministers—used strong language to condemn
constitutionalism, nonetheless these pieces, and those that followed,
marked a subtle shift in Party-sanctioned rhetoric on
constitutionalism. Unlike, say, the Ma Zhongcheng series of articles,
which attacked both Socialist Constitutionalism and Liberal
constitutionalism as very real anti-Party threats, Minister Yin
remained silent on mainstream socialist constitutionalist thought. His
182

Qian Gang, Parsing the Public Opinion Struggle, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Sept. 24,
2013), http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/09/24/34085/. See also Willy Lam, Ideological Crackdown
Reaches the Strongholds of Reform, 13 JAMESTOWN CHINA BRIEF, no. 19 (2013), https://
jamestown.org/program/ideological-crackdown-reaches-the-strongholds-of-reform/.
183 Id.
184 Yin Hanning ( 尹 汉 宁 ), Shenke Renshi Yishixingtai Gongzuo de Jiduan
Zhongyaoxing (深刻认识意识形态工作的极端重要性) [Deeply Recognize the Extreme
Importance of Ideological Work], QIU SHI ( 求 是 ) [SEEKING TRUTH] (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0916/c40531-22935925.html.
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piece, and those written by his colleagues, may have represented a
turning point in the Party’s approach to the Socialist debate, the first
step toward a return to a status quo ante in which the Party largely
tolerated academic discussion of Socialist Constitutionalism theories,
even as it held the line on refusing to implement meaningful
constitutional reforms of the sort advocated by Socialists and Liberals
alike.
This small but significant shift was carried into the pages of
the People’s Daily itself in late September. 185 The first People’s
Daily piece on the 2013 Constitutionalism debate, written by Shanxi
province Party Secretary Yuan Chunqing and entitled “Leading
Cadres Must Strengthen Their Political Convictions,” criticized both
universal values and Western-style constitutionalism, but did not
mention Socialist Constitutionalism as one of several “false
ideologies” that Party cadres must resolutely guard against.186 The
omission of Socialist Constitutionalism from the authoritative
People’s Daily piece was telling.
A mid-October article in Seeking Truth by Autumn Stone—
an alias—entitled “Consolidate the Common Intellectual Foundation
of the United Struggle of the Party and the People” took the process
of winding down the anti-constitutionalist push one step further.187
In it, the author emphasizes the “extreme importance” of a common
intellectual foundation, one that can unite the Party and the people
under the leadership of the CCP.
Like Yuan Chunqing before him, Autumn Stone cast
aspersions on the “international anti-China forces” who “push a
strategy of Westernizing and splitting China.” Yet the subtle
differences between the Autumn Stone piece and Yuan Chunqing’s
piece are in some ways more important than their commonalities.
Interestingly, Autumn Stone does not excoriate “universal values”
such as freedom, democracy, and human rights; instead, he reverts to
David Bandurski, “Struggling” Against Constitutionalism, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT
(Sept. 25, 2013), http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/09/25/34196/.
186 Yuan Chunqing (袁纯清), Lingdao Ganbu Bixu Zengqiang Zhengzhi Dingli (领导
干部必须增强政治定力) [Leading Cadres Must Strengthen Their Political Convictions],
RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (Sept. 24, 2013), http://politics.people.com.
cn/n/2013/0924/c1001-23009079.html.
187 Qiu Shi (秋石) [Autumn Stone], Gonggu Dang He Renmin Tuanjie Fendou de
Gongtong Sixiang Jichu (巩固党和人民团结奋斗的共同思想基础) [Consolidate the
Common Intellectual Foundation of the United Struggle of the Party and the People], QIU
SHI
(
求
是
)
[SEEKING
TRUTH]
(Oct.
16,
2013),
http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2013/201320/201310/t20131012_278250.htm.
185
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established Party practice of using such terms for the Party’s own
ends.
Perhaps most importantly, Autumn Stone offered some
qualified support for constitutionalism, arguing that the Party has
historically supported “ruling the country according to the
Constitution.” He launched a much more calibrated attack on
supporters of constitutional reform, singling out for criticism only
those who believe that “’constitutional democracy’ is almost the only
topic of discussion on political reform.” Explicitly excluding
supporters of Socialist Constitutionalism, Autumn Stone attacked
unnamed Liberals who would have China adopt Western-style
constitutionalism, and in so doing “cancel the leadership of the CCP,
and change our nation’s socialist system.”
Harsh though this language may sound, it is still vastly
different from the line adopted just two months earlier by Ma
Zhongcheng and others. In signaling that Socialist Constitutionalism
would once again return to the realm of acceptable discourse, those
behind the Autumn Stone piece were bringing an end the rhetorical
battle against mainstream academic constitutionalist discourse.
Why would the Party wind down its anti-Constitutionalist
campaign just a few months after it began? There are at least four
key reasons that explain the Party’s retrenchment: first, the anticonstitutionalist campaign had achieved its goal of pushing back
against growing calls in the first months of 2013 for constitutional
reform. Second, the new Party leadership led by Xi Jinping had
inoculated itself against charges that it was soft on Rightist would-be
reformers, thus making it easier to move forward with right-leaning
economic reforms. Third, bringing the debate to a close helped to
clear the ideological air in advance of the Third Plenum, which was
held in November.
Finally, bringing the debate to a close would return the
conversation to the status quo ante, and would allow the Party to
revert to its position of touting constitutional reform, falsely, as part
of its own political reform agenda. Less than a year after the end of
the debate, Party Secretary Xi Jinping himself returned to
constitutionalist rhetoric, closing the circle that he had opened with
his December 4, 2012 constitutionalist speech. In a September 2014
speech marking the 60th anniversary of the founding of the National
People’s Congress, Xi declared that “(t)he Constitution is the most
basic law of our country. Rule of the nation by law means, first and
foremost, ruling the nation in accord with the constitution; governing
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by laws is, first and foremost, governing in accord with the
constitution.” 188 Other references to constitutional governance
would follow over the course of the fall, signaling Xi’s intent to return
to constitutionalist rhetoric—if not action—as a key element of the
Party’s search for political legitimacy.
The end of the debate as signaled by Yin and Autumn Stone
also allowed mainstream academic voices to return to their prior
practice of making pro-constitutionalist statements that would, by and
large, reinforce the Party’s constitutional reformist credentials.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the responses of many intellectuals to the
Leftist push ignored the clear and abundant evidence of senior Party
involvement in the short-lived anti-constitutionalist campaign. For
many moderate intellectuals, a return to the status quo, in which
constitutional reform is always on the horizon, was a welcome return
to normalcy that they quickly embraced.

V.

SOCIALIST (AND OTHER) RESPONSES: A RETURN TO
THE STATUS QUO

Given that Leftist voices like Yang Xiaoqing’s have been
marginalized for decades, many mainstream academics were taken
by surprise by the high-profile spate of Leftist attacks on mainstream
Socialist constitutionalist thought.
Many public intellectuals—including those from disciplines
other than law, politics, and philosophy—simply lamented the return
of such extreme Leftist rhetoric.189 For many Chinese of a certain
age, such arcane and hard-edged terminology is redolent of the highly
charged – and highly dangerous—political discourse of the Cultural
Revolution, whose excesses are part of the lived experience of many
older Chinese intellectuals.
For those who were direct participants in the
constitutionalism debate, however, the Leftist push was a direct
attack on their own painstaking intellectual contributions to China’s
political development. A response—hopefully a vigorous one—was
needed.
188 Qian Gang, Xi’s Missing Terms Emerge Again, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Sept. 8,
2014), http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/09/08/35953/.
189 Li Yinhe (李银河), Xianzheng Lun Zhi Wo Jian (宪政论争之我见) [My View on
the Constitutionalism Debate], LI YINHE DE BOKE (李银河的博客) [LI YINHE BLOG] (May
30, 2013), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_473d53360102f0as.html.
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Initial responses from Socialist constitutionalists to Yang
Xiaoqing and her colleagues were often dismissive: one prominent
Socialist academic referred to the writings of Yang Xiaoqing and her
cohort as “laughable” and “preposterous,” 190 mocking her as
someone who “does not understand Marxism.” 191 Others used
similarly dismissive language.
But what was most notable about many of the mainstream
Socialist responses was the lack of analysis of the broader political
import of the anti-constitutionalist push. Instead of asking the most
basic question of why such pieces were appearing in prominent Party
outlets, most Socialists instead busied themselves with substantive
legal and theoretical responses, refuting Yang and others point by
point. It could be argued that such responses missed the point: if
Party elders were using the anti-constitutionalists to throw cold water
on the constitutionalist debate, then legal arguments would have little
impact on the CCP leadership’s political calculus.
Take, for example, the response of prominent Socialist
constitutionalist Hua Bingxiao. In a series of heavily-footnoted
papers published in the months following Yang’s piece, Hua argued
that Yang had fundamentally misconstrued Socialist legal theory, in
part by ignoring the contributions to that theory by Hua himself and
other key Socialist constitutionalist scholars.192 In Hua’s view, Yang
“perfected the art of distortion.” By pretending that other schools of
Chinese socialist thought did not exist, Yang created a universe in
which the only two options available were her (in Hua’s view,
simplistic and retrograde) take on Socialist constitutionalism, and
“Western, capitalist” constitutionalism. 193 Only through such
“deceitful methods” could Yang attain even a minimal level of
legitimacy for her “absurd theories,” Hua argued.194 Using a clutch
of references from Marx, Lenin, the German political theorist Herbert
Marcuse, Bukharin, Mao, and others, Hua then went on to elaborate
a complex and highly theoretical argument as to why, in the end,
Socialist legal theory and constitutionalism complement, rather than

190

Hua, supra note 139.
Hua, supra note 11.
192 Hua, supra note 139.
193 Id.
194 Id.
191
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contradict, each other. He condemned Yang and her colleagues as
Stalinists for their failure to recognize this fact.195
Instead of asking difficult questions about the political import
of the series of Leftist attack pieces, Hua went so far as to suggest
that the tail might be wagging the dog: he accused Leftists like Yang
of attempting to “trick Party and state senior leading cadres,” and of
trying to “drive a wedge between the Party, intellectuals, and the great
masses.”196 To be fair, Hua was writing before the publication of
similar anti-constitutionalist pieces published by several dozen Party
officials in September 2013. Those pieces make clear the connection
between the Party leadership and the anti-constitutionalist rhetoric
that appeared from May to November 2013.
Yet many scholars writing after September 2013 continued to
describe anti-constitutionalists as extreme Leftists who were fighting
against Xi Jinping’s reformist agenda. Tsinghua University physicist
and political commentator Ge Weikun, for example, cast anticonstitutionalists as fighting against “Chairman Xi’s vision” on
behalf of vested interests, who seek to “defend [their] illegal
occupation of economic wealth and state power, and continue their
suppression of calls for democracy.” 197 Such responses, though
erroneous, benefit the Party, by casting the CCP senior leadership as
fighting against vested interests and also fighting for constitutional
reform. Some commentators even went so far as to map the purge of
Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai and his apparent ally Zhou Yongkang
by Xi Jinping and others in the Party leadership onto the debate
between Yang Xiaoqing and her fellow Leftists and the Socialist
Constitutionalists, with Yang and her colleagues cast in the roles of
the evil duo, Bo and Zhou.198
Other responses focused less on theoretical questions and
more on political positioning as well as the practical difficulties of
reform. Wuhan University law professor Qin Qianhong, for example,
argued in an October 2013 piece that Socialist constitutionalism
should be seen as avoiding the excesses of both the Left (anticonstitutionalists) and the Right (the Liberals); as such, it was ideally

195

Id.
Id.
197 Ge, supra note 18.
198 Hua, supra note 139.
196
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suited to offer a feasible path to constitutional reform.199 Echoing
previous arguments made by other Socialist scholars, Qin asserted
that, unlike other camps, the views of the Socialist constitutionalists
could serve as the basis for a wide-ranging consensus which would
include both the vast majority of constitutional scholars and the Party
itself.
Interestingly, Qin spent more time arguing against the
theories of the Liberals than he did the anti-constitutionalists, despite
the fact that it was the Left that had launched what he called a “fierce
bombardment” against establishment scholars like himself. His
decision to do so might indicate that he viewed the Leftist moment as
having past, and thus not worthy of detailed scholarly refutation. Just
as Party propagandists had turned away from the moderates to train
their rhetorical fire on the liberal Right, so too did Qin turn away from
the hard Left, a spent force, to concentrate his energies on Rightist
liberals.
Qin also seemed to define constitutionalism downward,
listing various reforms that the Party had already embraced—
including inner-Party democracy, judicial reform, and new open
government information regulations—as key elements of
constitutional development. Qin seemed less interested in laying out
specific institutional reforms that the Party might embrace to bring it
closer to full constitutional enforcement.
Qin closed with a famous quote from the prominent early 20th
century scholar Hu Shi: “more study of problems, less talk of isms.”
“If the Socialist Constitutionalist conceptual debate returns to an
inquiry into problems,” Qin averred, “I guess Hu Shi would not
disagree.”
In referencing Hu Shi in this way, Qin seemed to be speaking
to his fellow Socialist constitutionalists, nudging them to focus on
specific reforms that meshed with the Party’s own already-articulated
agenda, and to avoid larger political debates over China’s future
reform path. For Qin and other Socialists, it seemed time to bring the
2013 Constitutionalist Debate to a close.
199 Qin Qianhong (秦前红), Shehui Zhuyi Xianzheng: Gainian Zhizheng Haishi Wenti
Zhizheng (社会主义宪 政:概 念之争还 是问题 之争) [Socialist Constitutionalism: an
Argument over Concepts or over Problems?], CAIJING (财经) (Oct. 14, 2013). The fact that
Qin was writing in the prominent business and finance news weekly Caijing may also have
signaled a relaxation on public commentary by moderates by the propaganda apparatus,
which would serve as a further signal that the 2013 constitutionalist debate was coming to a
close, and that the pre-2013 status quo was being reinstated.
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Just as Autumn Stone’s Seeking Truth article could be seen as
the Party-state’s signal that the anti-constitutionalist campaign was
coming to an end, a piece by prominent constitutional scholar and
People’s University Law School Dean Han Dayuan can be taken as a
strong signal of the academic community’s return to the pre-2013
status quo. That piece, entitled “Crossing the River by Feeling the
Constitution,” argued that the Party needed to shift its strategy away
from an experimentalist approach that heavily emphasized promarket economic reforms, and instead prioritize the construction of a
rule-based political system.200
Perhaps more that Qin, Han emphasized the serious
problems—including corruption and resistance to legal and
constitutional rules among local officials—that the Chinese
leadership currently faces. Indeed, the title of Han’s piece referred to
Deng Xiaoping’s famous maxim from the early reform period that
China should “cross the river”—of market reforms—by “feeling the
stones.” 201 Han makes clear that constitutional and rule of law
reforms would are in line with the Party’s own goals, including
maintaining the “leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.”
In essence, Han was directing his argument toward the CCP
leadership, arguing that it should adopt a new reform slogan, one
which emphasized constitutional values. In so doing, Han was
playing the classic moderate role of advising the state, rather than—
as Liberals would do—seeking to harness the reformist energies of
the Chinese people to push bottom-up reforms. Indeed, for Han, a
key step toward constitutional implementation is “cultivating the
constitutional awareness of civil servants, especially leading
cadres.” 202 Han’s articulation of a more traditional top-down
approach was yet another signal of a return to the pre-2013 status quo.
Finally, Han’s piece was notable as much for what it did not
say as for what it did. Han did not mention Yang Xiaoqing by name,
nor did he extensively engage with Leftist arguments at any point,
making his piece perhaps one of the first that did not take Yang’s
attack—or, for that matter, the 2013 constitutionalism debate as a
200 Han Dayuan (韩大元), Mozhe Xianfa Guohe (摸着宪法过河) [Crossing the River
by Feeling the Constitution], CAIJING (财经) (Oct. 24, 2014), http://magazine.caijing.com.cn
/2013-10-14/113413681.html.
201 Though the phrase is now associated with Deng, Han makes clear that the phrase
was first used as early as 1950 by CCP economic czar Chen Yun. Id.
202 Id.
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whole—as its jumping-off point for a broader discussion.203 Indeed,
Han’s piece almost entirely ignores the 2013 debate, which likely
signals that, for Han, that debate is over, and it is time to return to the
concerns that animated academic constitutionalist discourse before
the debate began, including, first and foremost, the need to educate
officials on constitutional values.
Virtually all of the responses by the Socialists reaffirmed
support for the Party-led constitutional development path. From the
Party’s perspective, these various responses also—most likely by
design—switched the terms of the debate away from key questions
of implementation, like how to construct a workable mechanism for
enforcement of constitutional rights, and toward the (to the Party)
much more amenable ground of the true compatibility of Socialism
and constitutionalism.
At bottom, however, such interventions—which, in essence,
are trying to win an academic and somewhat esoteric argument over
the compatibility of Socialism and constitutionalism – may miss the
point. The barriers to constitutional development in contemporary
China are not theoretical, but rather political—at present, the Party
has chosen not to move forward with a constitutional reform agenda,
one that would, for the first time in the history of the People’s
Republic, put institutional constraints on the Party’s exercise of
political power. And here, all too real limits on academic freedom in
China may come into play: many Chinese constitutional law scholars
may well feel, not without basis, that they would encounter very
serious professional and even personal risks were they to try to
analyze these difficult political dynamics in print.
Constitutional law scholarship that seeks to contribute to
constitutional development in China must address this very difficult
political question of the Party’s reluctance to embrace a true
constitutional reform agenda, rather than focusing exclusively on
more narrow theoretical concerns.

203 Han does mention, at least in passing, those on the left who “refuse to let go of their
vested interests,” and who “seem to persist in ‘Marxisim,’ [but who] essentially deviate from
fundamental concepts of Marxism, and cling tenaciously to conservative, backward concepts
and behavioral styles.” Id. As with Ge Weikun and others, Han, too, links Leftists to vested
interests who oppose Xi Jinping’s reform agenda.
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CONCLUSION: PARTY CONSTITUTIONALIST
PROPAGANDA RETURNS

Throughout most of 2014, constitutionalism remained largely
absent from official discourse. It was not until September that
constitutional terminology made a limited return: in a speech marking
the 60th anniversary of the founding of the National People’s
Congress, Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping declared that “[t]he
Constitution is the most basic law of our country. Rule of the nation
by law means, first and foremost, ruling the nation in accord with the
constitution; governing by laws is first and foremost, governing in
accord with the constitution.”204 Though Xi’s speech was published
in full in official media, both print and electronic media reports on
the speech neglected to mention Xi’s use of pro-constitutionalist
rhetoric.205
Pro-constitutionalist rhetoric was given an even more
prominent platform in October, when two key phrases—ruling the
Qian Gang, Xi’s Missing Terms Emerge Again, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Sept. 8,
2014), http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/09/08/35953/. It should be noted, however, that, on the
whole, Xi’s speech hewed largely to more conventional themes, including the leadership
position of the Communist Party and the need to advance “Socialism with Chinese
characteristics.” Various liberal reforms—including legal reform, judicial reform, and
reform of the People’s Congress system—were counter-balanced by clear qualifiers, such as
the need for Party oversight of state political and legal institutions. Xi Jinping (习近平), Zai
Qingzhu Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Chengli Liushi Zhounian Dahui Shang de
Jianghua (在庆祝全国 人民 代 表大会 成立 60 周年大会 上 的讲话) [Speech at the
Conference to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of the National People’s
Congress], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (Sept. 5, 2014), http://cpc.people.
com.cn/n/2014/0906/c64093-25615123.html.
205 Qian Gang, Xi’s Missing Terms Emerge Again, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Sept. 8,
2014), http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/09/08/35953/. For the Xinhua report on Xi’s speech, see Xi
Jinping (习近平), Zai Qingzhu Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Chengli Liushi Zhounian
Dahui Shang Fabiao Zhongyao Jianghua (习近平在庆祝全国人民代表大会成立 60 周年
大会上发表重要讲话) [Xi Jinping Gives an Important Speech at the Conference to
Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of the National People’s Congress],
XINHUA (Sept. 5, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/2014-09/05/c_1112382569.htm. For an
English-language report on the speech, see Xi Stresses Adherence to China's Political Path
Ahead of Legislature Anniversary, GLOBAL TIMES (Sept. 6, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/china/2014-09/05/c_133624166.htm. A full twelve-minute CCTV news report
on the speech also omitted any reference to Xi’s constitutionalist commentary, despite giving
extensive coverage to other aspects of the speech. Xi Jinping Zai Qingzhu Quanguo Renmin
Daibiao Dahui Chengli 60 Zhou Nian Dahui Shang Fabiao Zhongyao Jianghua (习近平在
庆祝全国人民代表大会成立 60 周年大会上发表重要讲话) [Xi Jinping Gives Important
Speech at 60th Anniversary Celebration of the NPC], SOHU (搜狐), http://tv.sohu.com/
20140905/n404115242.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
204
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country according to the Constitution and governing according to the
Constitution – found their way into the final text of the final document
of the 4th Plenum of the 18th Party Congress. That document, the
CCP Central Committee Decision Concerning Some Major
Questions on Comprehensively Moving Forward on Governing the
Country According to Law (the "Decision"), was viewed as a step
forward in that it focused heavily on rule of law and legal reform.206
The Decision also made reference to constitutional development,
echoing the language that Xi Jinping used in his September speech
on “ruling the country in accordance with the constitution” and
“governing in accordance with the constitution.”
Though the Decision’s heavy focus on legal reform and its
references to constitutional governance were welcome, nonetheless,
taken as a whole, the Decision was by no means a historic,
trailblazing document. It affirmed the leadership position of the
Communist Party, and maintained the Party’s position above the legal
system and above the law. For example, the Decision called for
“strengthening Party leadership over legislation work.”
That said, many observers pointed to language in the Decision
which, if acted upon, would strengthen the judiciary and the People’s
Congress system. 207 The Decision also called for progress on
“complet[ing] procedures and mechanisms for constitutional
interpretation,” raising the hope, as Xi’s December 2012 speech had,
that the Party would finally move forward on the construction of
institutions which could interpret and enforce constitutional norms,
including constitutional rights provisions. Once again, the Party was
using the Chinese Constitution as a false blueprint, one that would, at
an undefined point in the future, lead China toward a full embrace of
constitutional governance.
Yet without any specific actions to be taken to move forward
on creating such “procedures and mechanisms,” it seemed likely that
the Decision’s constitutional reform rhetoric would remain just
206

CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major Questions in
Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the Law Forward, CHINA
COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA (Oct. 28, 2014), https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/
2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-incomprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/
(translation).
207 See Don Clarke, The Fourth Plenum’s “Decision”: My Take, LAW PROFESSORS
BLOGS NETWORK (Oct. 29, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/
2014/10/the-fourth-plenums-decision-my-take.html.
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that—rhetoric.208 Indeed, the only specific action that the Decision
called for on constitutionalism was the proposal to declare December
4 National Constitution Day. The Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress duly took action on this suggestion, and
December 4, 2014 marked the first-ever observance of National
Constitution Day across China.209
Perhaps mindful of the 2013 constitutionalism debate, the
Party propaganda apparatus made sure to publish concurrently with
the Decision a warning about what was meant—or, more precisely,
what was not meant—by the constitutionalist references of the
Decision. That same day, October 24, the People’s Daily published
an editorial by one Guo Ping—a pseudonym—entitled, “Governing
According to the Constitution Must Not Be Confused with Western
‘Constitutionalism.’” 210 As the title suggests, Guo’s piece argued
that “in a word, governing according to the constitution is not
Western ‘constitutionalism.’ In fact, the two are completely different,
and we cannot allow the fundamental differences between the two to
be obscured.” Though much more mild in tone than the anticonstitutionalist attacks of 2013, nonetheless Guo’s piece signaled
that any attempts to appropriate the Decision’s rhetoric for purposes
beyond the CCP’s own limited and largely political agenda would not
be welcome.
Some have argued that the months-long official silence on
constitutionalism, followed by sporadic references, suggests a split
within the Party on the benefits of pro-constitutionalist rhetoric.211
And, indeed, there is some limited evidence to suggest that some key
elements within the Party wanted to keep any references to
Jerome Cohen, China’s New Constitution Day: Is It Worth Celebrating? 14
JAMESTOWN CHINA BRIEF, no. 22 (2014), https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-newnational-constitution-day-is-it-worth-celebrating.
209 Shannon Tiezzi, For China, Constitution Day Comes Without Constitutionalism,
DIPLOMAT (Dec. 4, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/for-china-constitution-daycomes-without-constitutionalism/.
210 Guo Ping (国平), Yixian Zhizheng yu Xifang Xianzheng Burong Hunxiao (依宪执
政与西方“宪政”不容混淆) [Governing According to the Constitution Must Not Be
Confused with Western ‘Constitutionalism,’], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY]
(Oct. 24, 2014), http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1024/c70731-25904899.html.
211 Qian Gang, Xi’s Missing Terms Emerge Again, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Sept. 8,
2014), http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/09/08/35953/ (“One thing we can be quite sure of . . . is that
there are people within the Party who are unsettled by Xi Jinping’s decision to use these
[constitutionalist] terms”). See also Qian Gang, The Missing Speech, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT
(Sept. 4, 2014), http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/09/04/35905/.
208
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Constitutionalism out of the Fourth Plenum Decision, and, most
likely, out of official Party discourse altogether.212 If true, then this
disagreement within the Party would mark a small but significant
setback for Xi Jinping, who is otherwise regarded as having moved
quickly to consolidate power and to solidify his own political position.
At the same time, the pattern of official discourse on
constitutionalism in 2014 is also consistent with prior efforts by the
Party to use constitutionalist rhetoric as a source of political
legitimacy. It is possible that, after the events of 2013, the Party
decided to wait for a period of months before returning to proconstitutionalist propaganda. In so doing, it allowed any lingering
memories of the Leftist push to recede, thus ensuring that its renewed
constitutionalist rhetoric in September and October would not be
tainted by association with those far-from-mainstream views.
The fact that it published the pro-constitutionalist Decision
and the more cautious warning by the pseudonymous Guo Ping on
the same day speaks to the authoritarian constitutional dilemma that
the Party continues to face: it wants to make use of proconstitutionalist rhetoric, but it cannot hit such notes too hard, for fear
that some listeners might take its rhetoric at face value, and seek to
use that rhetoric to force the Party to act on a full-fledged
constitutional agenda, something that it believes that it cannot do.
The need to proceed with caution in the face of such a
dilemma also explains the lack of prominent coverage given to the
constitutionalist sentiments in Xi Jinping’s September 5, 2014 speech.
The authoritarian constitutionalist dilemma also likely explains why
Party-controlled media outlets devoted much more attention to the
rule of law elements of the Fourth Plenum Decision, and gave relative
short shrift to the constitutionalist content.213
Overall, the use of pro-constitutionalist rhetoric is a minor
part of Xi Jinping’s political strategy. Roughly four years into his
tenure as China’s supreme leader, the outlines of Xi’s agenda are now
clearer: his administration remains heavily focused on the anticorruption campaign and on solidifying Party control over virtually
all important aspects of Chinese life. Over the past four years, there
has been a heavy emphasis on tightening up on civil society, and on
exerting greater control over the vehicles of public discourse,
212 Qian Gang, A Backstage Glimpse at the Plenum ‘Decision,’ CHINA MEDIA PROJECT
(Nov. 10, 2014), http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/11/10/37015/.
213 Qian Gang, China’s Constitution Roller-Coaster, CHINA MEDIA PROJECT (Nov. 6,
2014), http://cmp.hku.hk/2014/11/06/36962/.
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including the internet and the media. At the same time, a limited set
of legal reforms, along the lines of those put forward in the Decision,
are a smaller but still significant part of Xi’s reform plans. At least
as of this writing, it seems that any meaningful political system
reform, including constitutional reform, is not on part of Xi Jinping’s
agenda.
It may well be the case that the mix of a hard-hitting anticorruption campaign and tighter political cointrols will be enough to
preserve the Party’s political legitimacy, such that it is able to
maintain public support even in the face of slowing economic growth
and limited progress on political-legal reform.
Yet, the 2013 Constitutionalism Debate demonstrated the
deep-seated desire among many Chinese intellectuals, as well as an
uncountable number of Chinese citizens, for genuine constitutional
reform, including the development of institutions that would limit the
Party’s arbitrary authority, and would, for the first time, put political
power in China in an institutional cage. Time and time again, the
Party responds to this desire with pro-constitutional promises that are
never quite fulfilled. While this formula has worked well enough
over the past three decades, it is showing signs of age. It may be time
for the Party to acknowledge this, and move from a false
constitutional blueprint to a real one.
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